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Abstract
Many federally-funded construction projects include project
labor agreements that include working with specific unions to
complete a project. The uniqueness of the construction industry was
recognized in the National Labor Relations Act, which allowed
project labor agreements on construction projects. PLAs came back
to the forefront in 1992 when President Bush issued an executive
order prohibiting PLAs on federal construction projects. Since then,
a number of presidential executive orders have been issued
changing whether project labor agreements may be used. This
Comment analyzes the arguments for and against project labor
agreements in the construction industry, use of presidential
executive orders, precedential cases, and proposed congressional
activity.
[E]xcept in the middle of a battlefield, nowhere must men coordinate
the movement of other men and all materials in the midst of such
chaos and with such limited certainty of present facts and future
occurrences as in a huge construction project such as the building of
this 100 million dollar hospital. Even the most painstaking planning
frequently turns out to be mere conjecture and accommodation to
changes must necessarily be of the rough, quick and ad hoc sort,
analogous to ever-changing commands on the battlefield.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal construction projects are battlefields funded by
hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually by the United States
government in contracting goods and services.2 Although President
* Juris Doctor Candidate, The John Marshall Law School, 2019. Many
thanks to my family, mentors, and editors on The John Marshall Law Review,
all who helped make this Comment possible. All views and errors of this paper
are my own.
1. Blake Constr. Co. v. C. J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. 1981).
2. James F. Nagel, Gov’t Contracting, in FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTR. LAW
278, 278 (John W. Ralls, L. Franklin Elmore, Lauren Elizabeth Catoe eds., 2d
ed. 2013) (explaining that the US government spent over $500 billion in 2014);
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Trump promised a $1.5 trillion infrastructure plan,3 public works
spending fell over the past five years. 4 However, in 2017, natural
disasters caused monumental damage which brought the
battleground to the front lawns of United States citizens. 5 Fifteen
separate weather and climate disasters across the U.S. resulted in
$367.2 billion of damage.6 Cities and towns in Puerto Rico, Texas,
Florida, and California endured the devastating effects of natural
disasters.7 In an effort to rebuild their infrastructure, these cities
turn to contractors, thus begging the question: should government
agencies turn to project labor agreements (“PLAs”)? 8
A PLA between a labor organization, an owner, and sometimes
a general contractor guarantees the use of union labor on one or a
series of construction projects.9 PLAs supersede all other union
Contracting
Data
Analysis,
U.S.
GOV’T
ACCT.
OFF.,
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-244SP (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (stating in
2015, federal agencies spent over $430 billion on contracts).
3. Press Release, Tammy Duckworth, Duckworth Asks for Details on Trump
Administration’s Long Awaited Infrastructure Plan (Oct. 5, 2017)
www.duckworth.senate.gov/news/press-releases/duckworth-asks-for-detailson-trump-administrations-long-awaited-infrastructure-plan. However, when
Trump unveiled his $1.5 trillion plan, only $200 billion would come directly
from federal spending, and the other $1.3 trillion would come from state and
local governments. Lydia DePillis, Trump unveils infrastructure plan, CNN
BUSINESS (Feb. 12, 2018), money.cnn.com/2018/02/11/news/economy/trumpinfrastructure-plan-details/index.html.
4. Binyamin Appelbaum, Public Works Funding Falls as Infrastructure
Deteriorates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/us/
politics/infrastructure-trump.html.
5. Doyle Rice, Jim Sergent, George Petras, Janet Loehrke, 2017 could tie
record for billion-dollar disasters in a year. Here’s why, USA TODAY (Oct. 18,
2017),
www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2017/10/18/2017-could-tie-recordbillion-dollar-disasters-year-heres-why/763406001/ (explaining as of October 8,
2017, 1,391 tornadoes have torn through the U.S., “332 more than in all of
2016,” with an estimated cost of $5 billion.) The flooding in California, Missouri,
Arkansas, Illinois and other states is estimated to have cause $3.2 billion in
damage. Id. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria are estimated to have caused
between $294 – $362 billion. Id. The wildfires in California from October 8, 2017
to October 18, 2017 are estimated at $65 billion in damages. Id.
6. Id.
7. Doyle Rice, It’s been a stormy start to 2017 in the U.S., tying the 2 nd-most
natural
disasters
on
record,
USA
TODAY
(July
17,
2017),
www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2017/07/18/u-s-battered-2nd-most-naturaldisasters-record-so-far-2017/485167001/; see also Sean McGarvey, U.S.
Economy, contractors, and American workers benefit from PLAs, THE HILL (Apr.
24, 2017), thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/330274-projectlabor-agreements-a-win-win-us-economy-contractors (explaining that when it
comes to infrastructure contracts, PLAs deliver results – “namely, the need to
recruit and train a qualified skilled workforce to do the work, coupled with the
need to safeguard community wage and benefit standards”).
8. Id.
9. The two union labor organizations generally involved in PLA suits include
the Building and Construction Trades Council (referred to as “BCTC” in this
comment) or American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (“AFL-CIO”). The first Building Trades Council was founded in
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agreements and exclusively deal with only one union council or
federation to hire employees and negotiate benefits. 10 While terms
vary, most PLAs include a prohibition on strikes and lockouts. 11
Parties enter into a PLA after the architect or engineer determines
the scope of a project and before the owner extends an invitation to
bid.12 Contractors submit their bids and the project is awarded to
Chicago in 1890. BCTC is usually affiliated with a number of labor
organizations, including:
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
International Union of Elevator Constructors, International Association
of Heat and Frost Insulators and Allied Workers, International
Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron
Workers, Laborers’ International Union of North America, International
Union of Operating Engineers, International Union of Painters and
Allied Trades, Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ International
Association of the United States and Canada, United Association of
Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of
the United States & Canada, United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers
and Allied Workers, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and International Union of
Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers.
Affiliated Unions, BCTC OF GREATER N.Y., www.nycbuildingtrades.org/
html/unions.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). The AFL-CIO consists of 56
unions working together in state federations and local labor councils. Our
Unions and Allies, AFLCIO, aflcio.org/about/our-unions-and-allies (last visited
Mar 23, 2019). See Nagel, supra note 2 (describing that an owner is traditionally
the entity that is funding the project and can be a governmental or private
entity). A general contractor traditionally ensures that plans and specifications
become a tangible structure suitable to the owner, by managing schedules,
coordinating with subcontractors, procuring materials, and maintaining the
cash flow. Id. See Moran infra note 104 (explaining that governments can
require recipients of government funding use PLAs for a specific construction
project). Private sector companies such as Toyota and Wal-Mart have used
PLAs during a series of construction projects. Id.
10. Se. La. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. La. ex rel. Jindal, 107 F. Supp.
3d 584, 592 (E.D. La. 2015) (“Jindal”); GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
7-5700, PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENTS 4 (2010); Johnson v. Rancho Santiago
Cmty. College Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Rancho Santiago”).
For example, the Northwestern Indiana Building and Construction Trades
Council combines thirty local unions. Affiliates, NW. IND. BLD. & CONSTR.
TRADES COUNCIL, nwibuildingtrades.com/affiliates/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
11. Mayer, supra note 10, at 4.
12. John T. Clappison, Government Contracting, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
CONSTR. LAW 88, 88-89 (John W. Ralls, L. Franklin Elmore, Lauren Elizabeth
Catoe eds., 2d ed. 2013) (explaining that bidding a traditional design-bid-build
project begins when the owner contracts with an architect or engineer who
creates plans for a building that suits the owner’s needs). Those plans are
included with other bid documents which include a scope of work, qualifications
necessary (work experience, technological capabilities, financial capacity, etc.),
and procedural plans (how, when, and where the bids should be submitted). Id.
The owner then issues a “notice to bidders,” “invitation to bid,” or
“advertisement” published in a public newspaper. Id. The “notice to bidders”
states when bids are due, relevant contract documents, where to bid, and
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the lowest responsible bidder, contingent on signing the PLA.13
PLAs require all contractors to hire certain union workers or,
alternatively, require employees to join the union.14
Construction projects are either private or public. 15 In private
construction projects, the owners are private individuals or
companies who hold proprietary control over important decisions,
including whether to hire union labor. 16 The government can only
regulate private projects.17 However, publicly-funded projects are
both financed and regulated by either the federal or state
government.18 Sometimes the distinction between regulator and
proprietor becomes unclear.19 Disputes may have civil or criminal
penalties.20 State courts traditionally resolve disputes by
referencing persuasive federal precedent. 21 One main issue courts
consider is whether to require the hiring of unions on public
construction projects.22 Requiring or prohibiting unions on
construction projects, especially on large-scale projects, strongly
impacts the national economy.23
instructions on completing bid documents. Id. General contractors then “bid” on
the project after identifying costs for hiring subcontractors and procuring
materials. Id. See also David E. Rosengren & Thomas G. Librizzi, Bid Protests:
Substance and Procedure on Publicly Funded Construction Projects, CONSTR.
LAW., 1, 1 (1987) (explaining that competitive bidding encourages the lowest
price and best quality while also discouraging corruption, favoritism, and abuse
of discretion by public officials).
13. David J. Langworthy, Project-Labor Agreements After Boston Harbor: Do
They Violate Competitive Bidding Laws? 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1103, 1111
(1996) (qualifying “lowest responsible bidder” as a “responsible” contractor –
reputable, financially stable, experienced, and capable to perform the contract
– and provide the “lowest” bid – numerically the least cost). The government is
given great deference in determining which bidders are “responsible.” Id.
14. See id. at 1111. (stating employees must join the union council or
federation within seven days of the beginning of the project).
15. Nagel, supra note 2.
16. STEVEN M. SIEGFRIED, INTRODUCTION INTO CONSTR. LAW 1-2 (1987)
(citing Wester v. Belote, 103 Fla. 976, 982 (Fla. 1931)). While private contracts
have few restrictions, government contracts involve extensive regulation. Id.
Government contracts are inherently political and may favor certain businesses
over others. Id. See Nagel, supra note 2 (explaining that public government
construction projects constitute most of the high-dollar amount, high-profile
projects, including the Hoover Dam and the Big Dig in Boston).
17. See Nagel, supra note 2 (explaining that regulations include issuing
permits and zoning ordinances, outlining disposal methods and noise levels).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Pacific Architects Collaborative v. State of California, 100 Cal. App. 3d
110, 125 (1979) (stating that the court is strongly persuaded by decisions
relating to federal procurement bidding).
22. Siegfried, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
23. Project Labor Agreements Examined, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On

Employment, Safety, and Training, of the Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 6 (2000) (statement of Gary C. Miller,
Congressional Representative from California):
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This Comment focuses on the politics involved in federallyfunded public construction projects. The background will outline the
history of PLAs, including applicable federal law. Then, this
Comment will analyze whether the President has the authority to
execute orders in this area of law. Next, this Comment will analyze
whether state action is preempted by federal law. Then, this
Comment will discuss the current bills in Congress regarding PLAs
and their possible unforeseen ramifications. Finally, this Comment
will propose multiple solutions for PLAs in future construction
projects.

II. BACKGROUND
This Comment focuses on the question whether state
legislation frustrates the NLRA by considering various court
opinions. First, this section discusses the relationship between the
NLRA and PLAs. Second, this section delves into Supreme Court
decisions regarding PLAs and how those decisions shaped public
construction projects. Third, this section considers executive orders
and the separation of power between the executive and legislative
branches. Fourth, this section considers different responses from
the states. Finally, this section looks at whether the NLRA
preempts the state responses.

A. The Unique Circumstances of Construction Law
1. The National Labor Relations Act
Since the 1930s, owners and general contractors have
commonly used PLAs in construction projects. 24 The success of
PLAs on private construction projects led to implementation in the
public sector.25 The government used PLAs to neutralize the
intensely fragmented relationship between management and
unions, and to ensure the timeliness of construction projects. 26
PLAs were originally considered illegal because PLAs required the

If the PLA requires an owner to hire union craftsmen only, the owner
cannot even use their own employees. In addition, the owner will have
to make contribution to the union pension and health plans despite the
fact that the owner may offer their own plans. These requirements create
an economic barrier that prevent open shops from effectively competing
for PLAs. Id.
24. See id. (explaining that “[PLAs] have been around since the 1930s,
beginning with the Grand Coulee Dam, Hanford Nuclear Test Site, Department
of Energy’s Oak Ridge Reservation, and Cape Canaveral Air Station”).
25. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Keeping the Government Out of the Way: Project
Labor Agreements Under the Supreme Court’s Boston Harbor Decision, 12 LAB.
LAW. 69, 70 (1996).
26. Id. at 69.
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appointment of a single union representative even before an
election had taken place.27
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in
1935 to promote commerce and prevent industrial hardships caused
by labor-management disputes.28 Congress desired orderly and
peaceful procedures in labor-relations to protect employee rights
and deter labor disputes.29 However, when drafting the NLRA,
Congress failed to consider the nature of the construction
industry.30
Practically, PLAs address unique circumstances in the
construction industry, including short-term employment, the
employer’s need to set labor costs in advance of a project before
making an accurate bid, and the employer’s need for a steady supply
of labor for referral.31 During construction projects, short-term
hiring prevents employees from formally electing a bargaining
representative.32 Therefore, Congress expressly provided that PLAs
could contain “7-day union-security clauses, exclusive hiring-hall
referral procedures, and training and seniority requirements as
hiring priorities,” and employees could demand an election
pursuant to §§ 9(c) or 9(e) despite having a PLA in effect.33
Because of the strong impact this procedure had on the
construction industry, Congress amended the NLRA with the
Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959.34 The NLRA allows PLAs, which
require contractors to perform work only if they agree to become

27. See Langworthy, supra note 13, at 1106 (citing George Harms Constr.
Co v. New Jersey Turnpike Auth., 644 A.2d 76, 84 (N.J. 1994)).
28. National Labor Relations Act, PL 115-281 as codified in 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (1947) (“NLRA”).
29. Labor disputes affecting interstate commerce are heard by the National
Labor Relation Board (“NLRB”). The NLRA guarantees employees the right to
join unions, bargain collectively through representatives, and engage in certain
concerted activities. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). Congress amended the
NLRA with the Taft-Harley Act, outlawing closed shops, curtailing strikes and
boycotts, and giving employees the right to refrain from union activity. NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. (1947). Congress further amended the NLRA with the
Landrum-Griffin Act, which restricted picketing and boycotting, regulated
internal union affairs, and limited “top down” organizing campaigns by unions
to force employer recognition. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1947); Connell Const. Co.
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 615, 632 (1975).
30. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1947).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 86-741 at 19 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 777; reprinted in 1959
U.S.C.C.A.N., 2424, 2442.
32. NLRB v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, 434 U.S. 335, 349 (1978). S. Rep. 86-187
at 55 (1959), 1 Leg. Hist. 541-542; History 341-342, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1959, pp. 2318, 2373. Langworthy, infra note 34 and accompanying text.
33. John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1380-81 (2015).
34. Landrum-Griffin Act, NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(e) and (f) (1959); see
Langworthy, supra note 13, at 1107 (explaining that because of the short-term
nature of construction worker employment, it was extremely difficult to certify
a bargaining agent for a group of construction employees prior to the project
start date). In 1959, an exemption was passed for the construction industry. Id.
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bound by its terms.35 The NLRA also permits for pre-hire
agreements in the construction industry between employers and
labor organizations covering employees who have not yet been
hired.36 Without these exceptions, PLAs might have constituted an
unfair labor practice either by interfering with employees’ rights to
choose a representative or discriminating against non-union
members.37

35. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
36. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f); Todd v. Jim McNeff, Inc., 667 F.2d 800, 80102 (9th Cir. 1982) aff'd, 459 U.S. 1013 (1982) and aff'd, 461 U.S. 260 (1983)
(explaining that PLAs may be signed before the union represents a majority of
the employer's employees, and may continue through more than one project,
even if the new project has high employee turnover).
37. NLRA 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1959); Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 590; see also
Todd, 667 F.2d at 801-02:
for such an agreement (naming the unions to which all employees of all
contractors and subcontractors must belong) might be interfering with
employees' rights to bargain through representatives of their own
choosing, in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and 7, see id. §§ 158(a)(1) & 157, or
unreasonably discriminating against those who are not union members,
in violation of § 8(a)(3), [s]ee id. § 158(a)(3).
Id. Rarely used in the 1950s, renewed interested in PLAs encouraged use in
the 1960s. Perritt, supra note 2525, at 69-70. PLAs were commonly used in the
1970s, when wage inflation led to general price inflation of costs on construction
projects across the entire industry. Id. at 70.
Project labor agreements probably were first used in the 1930s on large
government-funded projects such as flood control and hydroelectric
dams. In the later 1940s the agreements were a regular feature of
projects at atomic energy facilities. There was a lull . . . during the 1950s.
However, . . . in the 1960s . . . there was the Walt Disney World
Construction Project Agreement, and large managers, such as Bechtel,
began to use project agreements.
Id. at 69-70. PLAs have generally gone legally uncontested until the 1990s
where their use on public projects reached the Supreme Court. Robert W. Kopp
& John Gaal, The Case for Project Labor Agreements, THE CONSTR. LAW. 1, 5
(1999). In Woelke, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld union signatory
subcontracting clauses in construction agreements. Woelke & Romero Framing,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 456 U.S. 645, 646 (1982). The Court held that Congress clearly
intended to protect these clauses as evidenced by both the plain language and
legislative history of § 8(e) and accepted “top-down” pressure for unionization.
Id. Congress intended to accommodate construction-specific conditions when it
modified § 8(e) added § 8(f) including the short-term nature of employment, the
contractor’s need for predictable costs and steady qualified labor, and the
custom of using PLAs in the construction industry. Id. In Boston Harbor, the
Supreme Court quoted Appellate Chief Judge Breyer, “this [PLA] is ‘the very
sort of labor agreement that Congress explicitly authorized and expected
frequently to find.’” Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. v.
Mass. Water Res. Auth., 935 F.2d 345, 347 (1st Cir. 1991). However, Congress
has not preempted the entire field of labor relations nor clearly outlined which
state regulations are preempted by the NLRA. Weber v. Anheuser–Busch, Inc.,
348 U.S. 468, 480–81 (1955). (Associated Builders & Contractors will be referred
to as “ABC” throughout this Comment).
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2. The Supreme Court: Is the Government Acting as a
Proprietor or Regulator on Public Projects?
The Supreme Court addressed PLAs in Boston Harbor,
creating a distinction between when the government acts as a
proprietor or as a regulator.38 In Boston Harbor, an independent
government agency (“MWRA”) hired a project manager (“Kaiser”) to
clean up the harbor.39 The project had a budget of $6.1 billion over
ten years, with no allowance for delays.40
Kaiser signed a PLA with a union council (“BCTC”) where
BCTC exclusively bargained for all current employees, and any
future employees must join the council’s union as a condition of
hiring.41 The parties agreed not to strike, or otherwise cause delay,
for the duration of the project.42 A third party, opposed to union
labor, filed an action with the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”).43 The NLRB determined the parties validly entered into
the PLA under the NLRA.44 Soon after, another third party opposed
to the use of union labor (“ABC”) 45 sued the parties alleging the
NLRA prohibits the parties’ pre-hire agreement.46 The D.C. District

38. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. ABC of Mass./R.I., Inc.,
507 U.S. 218, 222 (1993) (“Boston Harbor”).
39. Id.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 92, § 1-1 et seq. (1993); Fed. Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1972). Litigation which brought about this
clean-up project can be found at U.S. v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 757 F. Supp. 121,
123 (Mass. 1991).
40. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 222 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 92, § 11 et seq. (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 44A - 44I; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30
§ 39M (1990) and describing statutory authority for MWRA’s responsibilities as
an owner).
41. The Boston Harbor Wastewater Treatment Facilities Project Labor
Agreement was approved and adopted by MWRA’s Board of Directors “in May
1989 and incorporated into its solicitation of bids for work on the project.” Mass.
Water Res. Auth., 935 F.2d at 347, rev'd sub nom. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 218
and see MWRA Pet. App. 107a (including the full text of Agreement).
42. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 222 (showing that the District Court gave no
allowances for delays or interruptions.) The project manager must promote
worksite harmony, labor-management peace, and overall stability throughout
the project. Id. As a condition of the contract, all bidders agreed and were bound
by the provisions of the PLA. Id.
43. The non-party in this action was a contractors’ association who filed a
charge with the NLRB claiming the PLA violated the NLRA. Id. at 222.
44. Perritt, supra note 25, at 1-3; Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 222.
45. See Lund & Oswald, infra note 100, at 2 (describing that since 1999, the
Associated Builders and Contractors (“ABC”) have run well-financed and wellcoordinated national campaigns against PLAs including a legal and regulatory
team, a lobbying team, and a grassroots campaign).
46. ABC alleged preemption under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 and violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, conspiracy to reduce competition, and
various state law claims. The U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts rejected all of these claims and denied the requested injunction.
Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 222.
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Court rejected those allegations; however, the First Circuit
reversed, by allowing the injunction.47
On appeal, the Supreme Court outlined two distinct NLRA
preemption principles based on two cases: Garmon48 and
Machinists.49 Under Garmon, a state cannot require standards
inconsistent with the NLRA or provide their own regulatory or
judicial remedies for conduct prohibited under the NLRA. 50 Any
inconsistent state regulation, general or specific, frustrates the
congressional purpose and would be preempted by the NLRA. 51
Under Machinists, states cannot regulate an area that has been left
“to be controlled by the free play of economic forces” and must
preserve the intentional congressional balance between
management and labor.52 Congress intended for this gap to remain
unregulated by the NLRA and the states.53 State efforts to impose
further regulation regarding economic pressure in labor disputes
would be invalid under the Machinists principle.54
In Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court found neither Garmon
nor Machinists applied because MWRA acted as a purchaser of
construction services, validly entered into a PLA to ensure efficient
and timely completion of the project at the lowest cost, and tailored
the PLA to one project.55 State actions are not tantamount to
regulation as a proprietor or owner because, as a market
participant, the state can act without being preempted by the
NLRA.56 In contrast, if the government acted to regulate
construction projects, the government would be far more powerful
than a private actor performing the same regulation. 57
47. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 224 (explaining that the Circuit Court
held that MWRA’s pervasive intrusion in the bargaining process led to
impermissible regulation.) The PLA was preempted because MWRA was
attempting to regulate activities that Congress intended to be remain
unrestricted. Id. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 935 F.2d at 359-60; San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (“Garmon”); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976) (“Machinists”).
48. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236.
49. Machinists, 427 U.S. 132.
50. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 224; Garmon, 359 U.S. 236.
51. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244; see also Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 597 (citing
Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Lab. & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286
(1986) (“Gould”): “Preemption should not be inferred where policies address
conduct of peripheral concern to the NLRA or deeply rooted in local interests”).
52. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 225; Machinists, 427 U.S. at 147.
53. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 226 (citing Golden State, 475 U.S. at 614:
“Machinists pre-emption preserves Congress’ ‘intentional balance ‘between the
uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective
interests’”).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 229.
56. Id.
57. See id. (explaining the government plays a pivotally different role than
private parties). A private party may regulate by boycotting a certain supplier
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The Boston Harbor case legitimized PLAs for public projects
and implicitly recognized the ability of the government to act akin
to a private owner when acting as a proprietor in public construction
projects.58 Further, Boston Harbor recognized Congress’s intent to
accommodate construction industry-specific conditions, including
the short-term nature of employment, the contractor’s need for
predictable costs, and the need for a steady labor supply.59
3. Life After Boston Harbor: Gould and Brown Further
Define Regulation
Following Boston Harbor, the Supreme Court further defined
government actions as a regulator in subsequent cases.60 States
play a qualitatively different role than private parties when acting
as a regulator.61 Preemption only occurs when a state regulates in
a protected zone under either Garmon or Machinists.62 Therefore,
courts have found that Congress intended to preempt only state
regulation and not state action taken as a proprietor or market
participant.63
a. Gould: Government Boycotts are Tantamount to
Regulation
In Gould, the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute
using spending power instead of police power to regulate was
preempted by the NLRA.64 The statute forbade state agents from
conducting business with any person or company who violated the
NLRA at least three times within five years.65 Although nothing in
the NLRA prevents private parties from boycotting, government
boycotts have greater ramifications.66 By express prohibition of
state purchases from repeat labor law violators, Wisconsin’s action
or however they please without violating the Supremacy Clause. Id. However,
when governments boycotts, this action is in violation with NLRA preemption.
Id.
58. See Perritt, supra note 25, at 70 (citing Charles E. Murphy & Robert P.
Casey, A Detailed Policy and Legal Analysis of Public Owner Project Labor
Agreements iii (no date)).
59. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1027 (referencing Boston Harbor, 507 U.S.
at 231).
60. Gould, 475 U.S. at 286.
61. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 598 (referencing Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at
231).
62. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 226-27; see also Alameda Newspapers, Inc.
v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing a prerequisite
to NLRA preemption is finding that the government action in question
constitutes regulation of labor relations between employers and employees).
63. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1022; Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 691.
64. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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became tantamount to regulation.67
Thus, the pivotal difference between Boston Harbor and Gould
is that the interest in Boston Harbor was proprietary, whereas the
interest in Gould was regulatory.68 In Boston Harbor, “the public
agency limited its spending conditions to the protection of its
investment or proprietary interest.”69 In Gould, the state “deployed
its spending authority to achieve a goal far broader than merely
protecting or fostering its own investment or proprietary interest.” 70
b. Brown: States Cannot Use Regulation to Further a
Labor Policy
The Supreme Court held in Brown that a California statute
was subject to the Machinists preemption.71 The statute prohibited
certain employers who received state funding from using those
funds to assist, promote, or deter union organization. 72 Although
the statute acknowledged its policy to not interfere with an
employee’s choice regarding union membership, the Court found
“beyond dispute” that the state was regulating. 73
The Court found the legislative purpose furthered a labor
policy, which is not a legitimate response to local economic needs,
and failed to promote the efficient procurement of goods and
services.74 This viewpoint discriminatory statute negatively
restricted employer speech and only applied when an employer
discouraged unions.75
Under the analysis of Machinists, the statute regulated the
employer’s non-coercive speech about unionization, which is an area
Congress intentionally left unregulated. 76 Brown thus clarified the
Machinists exception to the Boston Harbor analysis and prevented
the government regulation.77

67. Id.
68. Hotel Emp. & Rest. Emp. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC,
390 F.3d 206, 214 (3rd Cir. 2004) (discussing Boston Harbor).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Chamber of Com. of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 63 (2008) (“Brown”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id at 70.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. The Supreme Court rejected the neutral statement of policy and instead
relied on the substance of the statute and its effects. While the Supreme Court
found that although this law was facially neutral, the law was regulatory in
effect, and therefore not valid under the market participant exception. Brown,
554 U.S. at 70 (quoting “[i]t is beyond dispute that California enacted AB 1889
in its capacity as a regulator rather than a market participant”).
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B. Presidential Orders Regarding Project Labor
Agreements
1. Do Presidents Have the Authority to Issue these Executive
Orders?
During four consecutive administrations, presidents issued
executive orders regarding PLAs. 78 Yet, the tenor of each executive
order changed depending on the political party in power. 79
A presidential executive order directs officers and agencies to
either perform or not perform certain tasks. 80 Although no language
in the U.S. Constitution expressly authorizes executive orders, the
basis lies in Article II of the Constitution.81 Article II, Section 1,
Clause 1 mentions “executive power” which is further detailed in
Section 3 to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 82
Together, these constitutional provisions allow the executive
branch to issue orders and Congress further reinforces presidential
executive orders regarding procurement.83 Every President has
issued executive orders in various ways and many Presidents used
them to make significant policy decisions. 84
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (“Youngstown”) gave the three levels of
presidential power used in determining executive overreach: 1) if

78. Exec. Order 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. § 12985 (1992 revoked by Exec. Order
12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. § 7045 (1993)); Exec. Order 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. § 48713
(1992 revoked by Exec. Order 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. § 7045 (1993)); Exec. Order
12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (1993 revoked by Exec. Order 13,201, 66 Fed. Reg. §
11221 (2001) (in part) and Exec. Order 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. § 11225 (2001));
Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. § 13023 (1995 revoked by Chamber of Com.
of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (“Reich”)); Exec. Order
13,201, 66 Fed. Reg. § 11221 (2001 revoked by Exec. Order 13,496, 74 Fed. Reg
§ 6107 (2009)); Exec. Order 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. § 11225 (2001 amended by
Exec. Order 13,208 66 Fed. Reg. § 18399 (2001) and revoked by Exec. Order
13,502, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6985 (2009)); Exec. Order 13,208, 66 Fed. Reg. § 18399
(2001 revoked by Exec. Order 13,502, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6589 (2009)); Exec Order
13,496, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6107 (2009). Exec Order 13,502, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6589
(2009) (collectively referred to as “Exec. Orders”).
79. Id.
80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952)
(“Youngstown”).
81. U.S. Const. art. II.
82. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 and U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
83. See Fed. Prop. and Admin. Serv. Act, 40 U.S.C. § 471 et seq.
(“Procurement Act”) (describing “[i]t is the policy of the executive branch in
procuring goods and services that, to ensure the economical and efficient
administration and completion of Federal Government contracts, contracting
agencies shall not contract with employers that permanently replace lawfully
striking employees”).
84. NCC Staff, Executive Orders 101: What are they and how do Presidents
use them?, CONST. DAILY (Jan. 23, 2017), constitutioncenter.org/blog/executiveorders-101-what-are-they-and-how-do-presidents-use-them/.

544

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:531

the President is acting in accordance with Congress’s will, then
presidential power is at its highest; 2) if the President is acting in
an area Congress has been silent, then presidential power is
determined by the facts of the case; and 3) if the President is acting
contrary to Congress’s will, then presidential power is at its
lowest.85
2. Presidential Executive Orders Regarding PLAs
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush issued the first two
executive orders concerning PLAs. 86 These orders prohibited
contractors from entering into PLAs on all public construction
projects.87 President William J. Clinton rescinded both orders and
enacted his own executive order that prohibited government
85. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (breaking down the analysis):
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for
what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is
held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that
the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore,
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive
Presidential control in such a case only be disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is
at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Id. (Jackson, concurring).
86. Exec. Order 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. § 12985 (1992 revoked by Exec. Order
12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. § 7045 (1993)); see also Exec. Order 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. §
48713 (1992 revoked by Exec. Order 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. § 7045 (1993))
(prohibiting government contractors from entering into pre-hire agreements in
the construction industry); Fed. Prop. and Admin. Serv. Act, 40 U.S.C. § 471 et
seq. (“Procurement Act”).
87. Id.
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agencies from using contractors who permanently replaced striking
workers.88 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the NLRA
preempted President Clinton’s executive order because the
regulatory order was tantamount to policy making, as further
discussed in the analysis section.89
In 2001, President George W. Bush signed three executive
orders90 that prohibited federal agencies from requiring or
prohibiting project labor agreements on future federally funded
construction projects.91 Although a union challenged the President’s
authority to issue these orders, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the President validly issued these orders under both
constitutional and legislative authority. 92 Similar to Clinton’s
88. This prohibition was limited to public projects over $100,000. Exec.
Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. § 13023 (1995 revoked by Reich, 74 F.3d 1322);
Exec. Order 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (1993 revoked by Exec. Order 13,201, 66
Fed. Reg. § 11221 (2001) (in part) and Exec. Order 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. § 11225
(2001)).
89. In 1995, the Chamber of Commerce and other employer associations
challenged Clinton’s executive order in the D.C. District Court. Chamber of
Com. of the U.S. v. Reich, 897 F. Supp. 570, 579 (D.D.C. 1995) (rev’d sub. nom.
by Reich, 74 F.3d 1322). The court determined that order was not judicially
reviewable or legal. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals asked only whether
there was a “reasonable nexus between the [president’s] actions and the pursuit
of economy and efficiency in the management of federal property.” Id. The Court
held that the President had the authority to issue these executive orders under
the Procurement Act, but that the executive order was regulatory in nature and
preempted by the NLRA. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1339; see also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618
F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied 443 U.S. 915 (1979)
(holding that the President did not have “a blank check . . . to fill in at his will”
but the President “make procurement policy decisions based on considerations
of economy and efficiency.”) “[T]his standard can be applied generally to the
President's actions to determine whether those actions are within the
legislative delegation.” Id. at 793.
90. Exec. Order 13,201, 66 Fed. Reg. § 11221 (2001 revoked by Exec. Order
13,496, 74 Fed. Reg § 6107 (2009)); Exec. Order 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. § 11225
(2001 amended by Exec. Order 13,208 66 Fed. Reg. § 18399 (2001) and revoked
by Exec. Order 13,502, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6985 (2009)); Exec. Order 13,208, 66 Fed.
Reg. § 18399 (2001 revoked by Exec. Order 13,502, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6589 (2009)).
91. When these executive orders were signed, the Governors of Maryland
and Virginia disagreed about whether to hire union-only workers on the
Woodrow Wilson Bridge, which connected to both states. After the signing of
these orders, the parties chose to use non-union crews. The Bridge Impasse,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A16 (noting that Bush’s executive order is a
contentious one between Maryland and Virginia, which were splitting the costs
of the project); Michael D. Shear, Wilson Bridge Labor Talks to Resume, WASH.
POST, Aug. 14, 2001, at B1.
92. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 32 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (“Allbaugh”) (analyzing the Youngstown standard that the
President’s authority “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself”). The District Court invalidated § 3 of Exec. Order 13,202 as
going beyond the scope of the President’s authority. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d
at 162. The Appellate Court determined that the President had the authority
over “any agency issuing grants, providing financial assistance, or entering into
cooperative agreements for construction projects.” Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 32.
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rescinding of H.W. Bush’s orders, President Barack H. Obama
rescinded the 2001 executive orders and replaced them with his
own.93 Obama’s executive order allowed, but did not require, federal
agencies to use project labor agreements on any construction project
over $25 million.94 As this Comment will further discuss, Congress
introduced bills in response to Obama’s order, but none left their
respective subcommittees.95
Although President Trump issued many executive orders, 96 he
has yet to rescind Obama’s executive order despite publicly
promising to do so and increase infrastructure spending.97 With the
Atlanta I-85 highway collapse in March 2017 and natural disasters
in Texas, Florida, California, and Puerto Rico, any potential
executive order by President Trump would likely be reminiscent of
the prior Bush executive orders.98
With these differing executive orders changing the policies on
PLAs, union and non-union stance strengthens and weakens
dependent on the party in power.99 Without consistency, contractors
are left to pick up the pieces while attorneys must deal with the
ramifications of continual changes in the law.

C. State Reactions to Project Labor Agreements
In response to these executive orders, many states have passed
legislation concerning PLAs while others remain silent.100 Below, a
map of the United States separates the states into three categories:
states with pro-PLA responses (blue), anti-PLA responses (red), and
states that have remained silent regarding PLAs (gray). These
issues will be further discussed below.

93. Exec Order 13,496, 74 Fed. Reg. § 6107 (2009); Exec Order 13,502, 74
Fed. Reg. § 6589 (2009).
94. Peters, supra note 27.
95. H.R. 735 – 112th Congress (2011-2012) introduced by Rep. John Sullivan
(R-OK) called “Government Neutrality in Contracting Act.” S.B. 119, 112th
Congress (2011-2012) introduced by Sen. David Vitter (R-LA) called
“Government Neutrality in Contracting Act.”
96. Trump has issued 64 executive orders since assuming the presidency,
none of them dealing with construction contracts other than building the wall.
Exec. Order 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. § 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
97. Juliet Eilperin & Darla Cameron, How Trump is rolling back Obama’s
legacy,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
4,
2017),
www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/politics/trump-rolling-back-obama-rules/?utm_term=.33bda9b5c198.
98. Umair Tariq, What the Atlanta Highway Collapse Signals About
American Infrastructure, VALUEWALK (Apr. 7, 2017), www.valuewalk.com/
2017/04/atlanta-highway-collapse-infrastructure/.
99. Exec. Orders, supra note 78.
100. John Lund & Joe Oswald, Public Project Labor Agreements: Lessons
Learned, New Directions, 26 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 10-11 (2001) (citing Robert A.
Jordan, PLAs as a Benefit to Contractors, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 6, 1999)).
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1. States Advocating PLAs
As the above map indicates, eight states have passed
legislation or issued executive orders promoting the use of PLAs and
argue for the advantages of PLAs. 102 Congressman Pete Visclosky
(D-IN) stated, “I strongly support the use of project labor
agreements and have consistently worked to encourage their use in
order to ensure fair wages and that workers in Northwest Indiana
and across our nation perform to the highest standard.”103 PLAs are
favored for a number of reasons.104
Proponents advance nine benefits for using PLAs. 105
101. Created by Chelsea Button using Simple Maps, saved at
simplemaps.com/custom/us/9zCBIHx.
102. California – Public contracts: public entities: project labor agreements,
S.B. 922 (CA 2011). Connecticut – Prevailing wage requirements or project
labor agreement. Compliance with state and local requirements. Agreements re
operations or maintenance of state facilities, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-261 (2011).
Hawaii – Haw. Admin. Directive No 12-05 (May 22, 2012), budget.hawaii.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2012/11/AD-12-05-Use-of-Project-Labor-Agreements-forState-Construction-Projects.pdf. Illinois – Ill. Exec. Order 2003-13, codified as
Project Labor Agreements Act 30 ILCS 571/1, et al (2011). Maryland – Md. Exec.
Order 01.01.2013.05 (Sept. 23, 2013), mdrules.elaws.us/comar/01.01.2013.05.
New Jersey – N.J. Exec. Order No. 1 (2002). Governor McGreevey Signs
Executive Order Supporting Project Labor Agreements, JERSEY CITY ONLINE,
(Jan. 2002), www.bayonneonline.com/governor/order.htm. New York – N.Y.
CLS Lab. § 222 (July 1, 2008), www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/LAB/222.
Washington – Wash. Exec. Order 96-08 (Dec. 6, 1996), www.governor.wa.gov/
sites/default/files/exe_order/eo_96-08.pdf.
103. Congressman Pete Visclosky (D-IN) is the U.S. Representative for the
1st congressional district of Indiana.
104. JOHN MORAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL0360, PROS AND CONS OF
USING PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENTS (2011).
105. Id.
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1. PLAs provide uniform wages, benefits, overtime pay, hours,
working conditions, and work rules for work on major
construction projects.106
2. PLAs provide contractors and the owner with a reliable and
uninterrupted supply of qualified workers at predictable
costs.107
3. PLAs seek to ensure that a project will be completed on
time and on budget due to the supply of qualified labor and
relative ease of project management.108
4. PLAs help ensure minimal or no labor strife by prohibiting
strikes and lockouts and including binding procedures to
resolve labor disputes.109
5. PLAs make large projects easier to manage by placing
unions under one contract, rather than separately bargaining
with several unions that may have different wage and benefit
structures.110
6. PLAs may include provisions to recruit and train workers
by requiring contactors to participate in recruitment,
apprenticeship, and training programs for women, minorities,
veterans, and other under-represented groups.111

106. Id.; Congress enacted the Davis Bacon Act, requiring employers on
federally-funded projects to pay their workers a prevailing wage. Davis Bacon
Act, 40 U.S.C. §1341, et seq. (formerly 40 U.S.C. §276(a) (1931); WILLIAM G.
WITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DAVIS-BACON ACT: SUSPENSION 15
(2005). Davis-Bacon requires the Secretary of Labor to determine the minimum
hourly rate and fringe benefits for each class of mechanic and laborer for a
particular geographic area called the “prevailing wage.” Davis Bacon Act, 40
U.S.C. §3142(a) (1931); Contract provisions and related matters, 29 C.F.R.
§5.5(a) (2000); see also George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Chao, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3318 (D. Conn., Jan. 23, 2006) (explaining that a contractor can satisfy
its prevailing wage obligation by: paying workers in cash equal to prevailing
wage and benefits; pay the basic hourly rate and contribute additional specified
amounts to an employee fringe benefit program; or a combination of the two so
long as the total meets the prevailing wage amount determined by the Secretary
of Labor); ELIZABETH H. CONNALLY, Key Labor and Employment Clauses for
Construction Agreements in CONSTR. LAW. GUIDE TO LAB. & EMP’T LAW 316,
316 (2d ed. 2016).
107. Moran, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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7. PLAs reduce misclassification of workers and the related
underpayment of payroll taxes, workers compensation, and
other requirements.112
8. PLAs indicate a larger percentage of construction wages
stay in-state.113
9. PLAs may improve worker safety by requiring contractors
and insisting compliance with OSHA and additional project
safety rules.114
PLA proponents note the positive impact of creating career
paths for women, minorities, veterans, and other under-represented
populations.115 Developing qualified workers in the construction
trades along with the inclusion of people historically
underrepresented in the trades has a positive long-term economic
benefit for the individuals who not only receive the jobs, but for the
construction industry as a whole.116 Owners and general contractors
who favor PLAs know the specific wages, benefits, worker quality,
and deadlines before the project begins.117 PLAs include procedures
that minimize labor disputes, one of the reasons for the creation of
these agreements.118
2. States Opposing PLAs
Twenty-two states have passed legislation, passed
constitutional amendments, or issued executive orders that are
facially neutral or outright ban PLAs. 119 Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ)
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.; Project Labor Agreements, CRS R41310 (2010).
118. Moran, supra note 104.
119. Alabama – Fair and Open Competition in Gov’t Constr. Act., ALA. CODE
§ 39-8-1 (2014).
Arizona – Fair and Open Competition Act, H. R. 115-1068, 115th Congress,
2d Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
Arkansas – Fair and Open Competition in Gov’t Constr. Act, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 22-9-801 (2015).
Florida – Legislative Intent, FLA. STAT. § 287.001 (2017).
Georgia – Public Works Constr. Contracts, GA. CODE ANN. § 13-10-3(d)(1)(A)
(2013).
Idaho – Public works -- Wages, IDAHO CODE § 44-2013(4) (2012).
Iowa – Fair and Open Competition in Gov’t Constr. Act, IOWA CODE § 73A.25
(2017).
Kansas – Competitive Bid Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-2002
(2012).
Louisiana – Contracts in which Public Entities are Participants;

550

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:531

is a strong opponent to PLAs.120 “The federal government should not
support policies that discriminate against Arizona businesses and
artificially inflate construction costs,” Flake stated after
introducing an anti-PLA bill in the U.S. Senate in March 2017.121
“By expanding opportunities for Arizona’s non-union firms, this bill
will help drive down costs on federal construction projects and
ensure that taxpayer dollars are invested in construction and job
creation, not lining the coffers of politically-connected unions.”122
Flake’s anti-PLA bill failed to pass during the 115th Congress. 123
Prohibitions and Duties; Contractors’ rights, LA. STAT. ANN. § 38:2225.5 (2014).
Michigan – Fair And Open Competition In Gov’t Constr. Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 408.871-883 (2011).
Mississippi – Miss. Emp’t Fairness Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-15-1 et al.
(2014).
Missouri – Requirements for Certain Contracts for Constr. of Projects
[Effective until August 28, 2017], MO. REV. STAT. § 34.209 (2017).
Montana – Prohibition – Project Lab. Agreement, MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-2425 (1999).
Nevada – Contract for public work for which estimated cost exceeds
$250,000 must be awarded to contractor who submits best bid, NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 338.147 (2015). “Project labor agreements are not absolutely prohibited and
will be upheld if adopted in conformity the objectives of the Nevada competitive
bidding laws.” ABC, Inc. v. S. Nev. Water Auth., 979 P.2d 224 (Nev.1999).
North Dakota – Competition in Gov’t Constr. Contracts, N.D. CENT. CODE
§48-12-01 et al. (2013).
Oklahoma – Fair and Open Competition in Gov’t Constr. Act, OKLA. STAT.
tit. 61, § 86, et al. (2012).
South Carolina – Non-Discriminatory Procurement of Constr.-Related Serv.
by the State, Exemptions, S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-15-70 (2013).
South Dakota – Pub. Pol’y for Fair and Open Competition in Gov’t Contracts
Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §5-18A-42 (2014).
Tennessee – Freedom in Contracting Act, Prohibited Provisions in Bid
Specifications, Project Agreements, and Other Documents, TENN. CODE ANN. §
12-4-903 (2011).
Utah – Emp’t. on Pub. Works, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-30-14(3) (1995).
Virginia – Contract Formation and Admin., Pub. Works Contract
Requirements, VA. CODE ANN. §2.2-4321.2(B)(1) (2012).
West Virginia – Gov’t Constr. Projects, Certain Lab. Requirements not to be
Imposed on Contractor or Subcontractor, W. VA. CODE § 5-22-3, et al. (2015).
Wisconsin – Pub. Works and Projects, WIS. STAT. § 66.0901(6m) (2017).
Contrary to the excel spreadsheet provided on The Truth About PLAs’
website, North Carolina’s H.B. 110 did not pass the Senate and was not signed
into law. Compare House Bill (2017-2018 Session), N.C. Gen. Assembly,
www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2017/h110 (last visited Mar. 23, 2019) with A Total
of 24 States Restrict Government Mandated Project Labor Agreements,
THETRUTHABOUTPLAS (Jan. 28, 2018), thetruthaboutplas.com/2018/01/26/atotal-of-24-states-restrict-government-mandated-project-labor-agreements/.
120. Flake Introduces Bill to Lower Federal Construction Costs and Increase
Opportunities for Underrepresented Contractors, FLAKE (Mar. 14, 2017),
www.flake.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=13B2DE46-B5904A77-8EE9-532DCE35DC62.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. All Info, CONGRESS, www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/622/all-info (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
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An organization dedicated to non-union labor, Associated
Builders and Contractors (“ABC”), is another vocal opponent of
PLAs, offering numerous arguments against PLAs. 124
1. PLAs drive up project costs by attracting fewer bidders. 125
Not all bidders use union labor and are therefore excluded
from bidding.126
2. PLAs increase project costs by requiring high union
wages.127 Third, PLAs violate “lowest responsible bidder”
laws.128 The lowest responsible bidder is a bidder who is
qualified, offers the lowest or best bid, capable of completing
the project, and can meet the standards required by the
project.129 PLAs can violate these laws by changing who can

124. Moran, supra note 104; Lund & Oswald, supra note 100, at 10.
125. Get The Truth, THE TRUTH ABOUT PLAS, thetruthaboutplas.com/getthe-truth/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
126. However, this claim is more inflammatory than scientific.
Unfortunately, increased costs are a reality on many projects and are not
insulated by PLAs. Cost overruns on union-only PLA construction projects
include Boston Central Artery ($2.5 billion over), East Side Reservoir in Los
Angeles ($220 million over), Justice Center in Parma, Ohio ($2 million over), St.
Louis Federal Courthouse (unknown, but damages claimed for over $2 million).
ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, MARYLAND FOUND. FOR RESEARCH AND ECON. EDUC.,
REVIEW OF THE GUIDANCE FOR A UNION-ONLY PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENTS
FOR CONSTRUCTION OF WILSON BRIDGE (2000).
The Seattle Times reported the Western Washington ABC Chapter argued
using PLAs on the Puget Sound Transit Board’s project would “needlessly
increase the cost of construction by limiting the number of bidders on the
project, restricting bidding to union firms or those few open-shop companies
willing to sign a project agreement. Reduced bidding competition means taxpayers will pay more than they need to for a regional transit system – a lot
more.” However, BCTC countered that one-third of the registered contractors
on the project were non-union and the additional costs were due to last-minute
changes by owners and design mistakes. See Lund & Oswald, supra note
100,100 at 10-11 (citing Kathleen B. Garrity, Labor pact will make RTA costs
jump, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20, 1999, at p. B5 (emphasis in original) and Rick
S. Bender & Allan B. Darr, Transit Job Too Important Not to Include Labor
Pact, SEATTLE TIMES, May 26, 1999, at B5).
127. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125; Lund & Oswald, supra note
100, at 12. However, this claim fails to consider Davis Bacon wages, which are
required on all major federally-funded projects. Moran, supra note 104. Davis
Bacon requires all employees be paid the “prevailing wage” determined by
particular geographic areas determined by the Secretary of Labor on all federal
public construction projects in excess of $2,000. Davis Bacon Act, Rate of Wages
for Laborers and Mechanics, 40 U.S.C. §3142(a) (2002). Contract Provisions and
Related Matters, 29 C.F.R. §5.5 (1983).
128. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125. However, nearly every state
has either indicated no violation or criteria to review PLAs on a case-by-case
basis. Lund & Oswald, supra note 100, at 12.
129. Lowest Responsible Bidder, BUS. DICTIONARY, www.business
dictionary.com/definition/lowest-responsible-bidder.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2019).
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be qualified – those who use union labor – and does not award
the project to the bidder with the actual lowest bid. 130
3. PLAs fail to deliver on their promised labor peace.131 While
PLAs are believed to prevent labor disagreements and
disruption, that is not always the case. 132
4. PLAs prevent non-union firms and workers from bidding or
working on certain publicly owned projects and discriminate
against non-union workers.133
5. PLAs don’t improve safety on projects.134
6. PLAs discourage competitive bidding and interfere with the
competitive nature of the market.135
Many opponents believe that a PLA “effectively unionizes an
entire construction project because all union and non-union
contractors must comply with certain union protocol and
procedure.”136 Opponents also argue that PLAs discriminate
against the majority of the workforce, since only 14% of the
American construction workforce is unionized. 137 ABC successfully
led campaigns in Indiana and Kentucky and repealed the state
prevailing wage law prohibiting state agencies from establishing or
mandating a wage schedule for state public works contracts. 138

130. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125.
131. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125. Although ABC pointed to a
carpenter’s strike, most carpenters were back to work the next day and resolved
the strike shortly thereafter. Id. (citing Strike Sets Stage for Court Case, ENG’R
NEWS-RECORD, vol. 242, no. 21, p. 18 (1999)).
132. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125.
133. Id.; Lund & Oswald, supra note 100, at 14-16.
134. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125; see Moran, supra note 104
(explaining that research provided by both sides does not show that PLA
construction projects are always safer, timely, and efficient than non-PLA
projects).
135. The Truth About PLAs, supra note 125; see also Joe Woodard, UnionOnly Project Agreements Restrict Open Competition, ENG’R NEWS-REC., at 66
(July 18, 1994) (stating “[p]ublic contracting agencies are requiring that all
contractors on their projects become signatory to union-only project labor
agreements. … The practice flies in the face of state competitive bidding and it
is out of control).
136. Cent. Iowa BCTC, AFL-CIO v. Branstad, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
104871, at *3 (S.D. Iowa, Sept. 7, 2011).
137. Langworthy, supra note 13, at 1105; George Leef, Here’s An Easy Way
For Trump to Cut the Cost of Government, FORBES (May 6, 2017) www.forbes
.com/sites/georgeleef/2017/05/06/heres-an-easy-way-for-trump-to-cut-the-costof-government/.
138. In 2015, ABC of Indiana/Kentucky mounted campaigns to eliminate or
effectively lower the prevailing wage around Indiana. In doing so, the prevailing
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However, this repeal did not affect any work performed on federallyfunded projects covered by Davis Bacon.139
3. Comparing PLA and Non-PLA Projects: Which is Better?
Projects with and without PLAs are difficult to compare
because each project is unique, but the Boston Globe analyzed two
similar projects – one with a PLA and one without.140 The project
without the PLA ended up initially bidding lower, but incurred $2
million overrun and an additional $1.5 million for overtime to
complete the project on time when compared to a similar project
with a PLA.141
The University of California Berkley Labor Center conducted
a two-part study analyzing the effects of using PLAs in the
construction of community colleges in California. 142 The first part
involved seven projects: three with PLAs and four without. 143 The
PLA projects attracted a similar number of bidders, bid at a slightly
lower price point, had similar or fewer construction problems, and
trained more young, local workers.144 The second part involved a
statistical study of 263 community colleges, showing PLA projects
with slightly more bidders and slightly lower bids than non-PLA
projects.145 The study concluded that PLAs do not reduce the
number of bidders, raise costs on these projects, or increase the time
to complete projects.146
wage dropped below the common union wage and made union employment less
attractive. Common Construction Wage Home, IND. DEP’T OF LAB.,
www.in.gov/dol/2723.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). In early 2017, ABC
successfully lobbied Right to Work laws and repeal the prevailing wage in
Kentucky. Catrona Lanctot, Victory in Frankfort: Right to Work and Prevailing
Wage, A.B.C. OF IND./KY. (Jan. 12, 2017), www.abcindianakentucky.org/victoryin-frankfort-right-to-work-and-prevailing-wage/; Davis Bacon Act, ABC OF
IND./KY., www.abc.org/Politics-Policy/Issues/Davis-Bacon-Act (last visited Mar.
24, 2019).
139. Id.
140. See Lund & Oswald, supra note 100, at 10-11 (citing Robert A. Jordan,
PLAs as a Benefit to Contractors, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 6, 1999)).
141. Id.
142. Emma Waitzman & Peter Philips, Project Labor Agreements and
Bidding Outcomes: The Case of Community College Construction in California,
U.C. BERKLEY LAB. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2017), laborcenter.berkeley.edu/project-laboragreements-and-bidding-outcomes/.
143. See id. (providing that in 2004, Marin County passed a bond measure
allowing for nearly $250 million to upgrade the College of Marin). It included
construction of seven buildings, three with PLAs and four without between 2008
and 2015. Id.
144. Id. (explaining that all seven buildings were completed on time).
Although each project was initially completed under budget, two of the four nonPLA projects involved cost overruns which exceeded their original budgets. Id.
These costs were determined to relate to architectural errors rather than faulty
construction. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (finding that the second study’s PLA projects had slightly more
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While the states disagree on whether to allow PLAs, both sides
make a number of viable arguments. One study done in California,
a pro-PLA state, concluded that using union labor did not confirm
the arguments against PLAs. However, with only one study, it is
difficult to ascertain whether this study is conclusive in other
jurisdictions.

D. Does the NLRA Preempt the States?
Congress retains the power to preempt state law via the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.147 In preemption cases, the court
must assume that state police powers remain unless Congress
expressed preemption.148 Without express preemption by Congress,
state action can also fall under implied preemption: field
preemption or frustration of purpose.149 Field preemption exists
when the federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive, it occupies the
entire field.150 A state law frustrates the purpose of a federal law
when it obstructs Congress’s purpose and objective. 151
States would argue that under their dormant commerce clause
power, they have the authority to decide whether to enter into a
PLA because doing so affects the rights and welfare of its citizens
and furthers a legitimate state interest. 152 Even if the state
regulation is preempted, a state would argue that, when engaging
in the buying of goods and services, it can enter into PLAs similar
to private parties and fall under the market participant
exception.153 The NLRA does not contain an express statutory
preemption provision nor indicate congressional intent to supplant
the entire field of labor law.154 Therefore, only state action that
bidders compared to non-PLA projects, but that the difference was not
significant; the same analysis followed for the lower price point).
147. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
148.Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (finding that in all
preemption cases, the court must “start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”).
149. Id. at 625.
150. Id. at 569; see also Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 577
(7th Cir. 2012) (stating “[s]ome federal statutes do receive such wide berths as
to displace virtually all state laws in the neighborhood. (The National Labor
Relations Act and ERISA are the best examples)”).
151. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 602; see also Gregory v. Burlington Northern R. Co.,
638 F. Supp. 538, 547 (D. Minn. 1986) (reasoning that while the Railway Labor
Act doesn’t explicitly state railroad employees cannot initiate discharge
disputes with federal courts, doing so would bypass arbitration procedures.)
Doing so would frustrate the congressional purpose of the RLA – promoting
stability in labor-management relations and minimizing interruptions in the
nation’s transportation service. Id.
152. Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222, 1231
(10th Cir. 2011).
153. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 592.
154. Id.; Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985); Brown v.
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frustrates the purpose of the NLRA would be preempted.155
1. The Fifth Circuit Distills the Market Participant
Exception
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used Cardinal Towing156 to
distill Boston Harbor into a two-part test, which many circuit courts
have relied on.157 In determining the proprietary nature of the
government’s actions, the Fifth Circuit asked two questions:
First, does the challenged action essentially reflect the entity's own
interest in its efficient procurement of needed goods and services, as
measured by comparison with the typical behavior of private parties
in similar circumstances? Second, does the narrow scope of the
challenged action defeat an inference that its primary goal was to
encourage a general policy rather than address a specific proprietary
problem?158

These questions isolate and compare government action in the
market with the actions of private parties to rule out regulatory
behavior.159
If the government’s goal advances societal goals – such as
punishing labor practices by disfavoring or withholding contract
work – rather than narrowly focusing on spending power in
contracting, the labor practice would be preempted. 160 The
Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 50102 (1984).
155. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 592; Metro Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747;
Brown, 468 U.S. at 501-02.
156. Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc., v. City of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d
686, 693 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Cardinal Towing”) (describing that before November
1995, the City of Bedford, Texas (“City”) permitted towing services to
individually tow vehicles, store the vehicles at their respective lots, and then
owner would ultimately pay for the service). In November, the City instead
contracted with one company to tow all requests by City officials, not by private
parties. Id. The City’s bid contained certain requirements, including short
response times and access to a wrecker. Id. Three companies submitted bids
and the contract was awarded. Id. A non-winning bidder who didn’t meet the
requirements complained as the City re-bid the contract. Id. The bidder didn’t
win again because it still hadn’t met the requirements and filed a
discrimination suit. Id.
157. Id.; see also Healthcare Ass'n of N.Y. State v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 89
(2d Cir. 2006) (showing the Second Circuit adopted Cardinal Towing's test); see
also Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hosp. Res., LLC, 390
F.3d 206, 207 (3d Cir. 2004) (showing the Third Circuit adopted a test similar
to Cardinal Towing); see also N. Ill. Chapter of ABC, Inc. v. Lavin, 431 F.3d
1004 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Lavin”) (showing the Seventh Circuit adopted a test
similar to Cardinal Towing); Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1016 (showing the
Ninth Circuit adopted Cardinal Towing's test).
158. Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693.
159. Id.
160. Id at 692; see Reich, 74 F.3d at 1339 (describing the NLRA preempted
the executive order barring the federal government from contracting with
companies that permanently replaced striking workers); see also Air Transport
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municipal government in Cardinal Towing acted as a typical
private party when it selected a towing service to remove
abandoned and disabled vehicles on public streets. 161 The ordinance
and contract specifications both promoted “efficient procurement”
and were “narrow.”162 The municipality chose a single company to
handle all of its towing needs which minimized confusion, clarified
responsibility, and provided a unitary standard for all towing. 163
The contract specifications related to towing, a core interest to the
government’s efficient running, and limited the towing to only nonconsensual tows requested by local police. 164
2. Market Participant Exception: Efficient Procurement –
Best Value Does Not Always Mean Cheapest
Many courts have discussed the first prong of the Cardinal
Towing test: efficient procurement.165 The Ninth Circuit
determined in Rancho Santiago166 that “efficient procurement” does
not simply mean “cheap,” but instead means that the procurement
must “serve the state’s purpose.”167 Legitimate purposes are not
Assoc. of Am. v. City and County of San Fran., 992 F.Supp. 1149, 1179
(N.D.Ca.1998) (analyzing an ERISA preemption of a city ordinance barring
contracts with employers that failed to offer domestic partner benefits to its
workforce, where combating discrimination was ordinance’s primary goal and
its terms were overbroad).
161. Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1016; Bldg. Indus. Elec. Contractors
Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 678 F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir. 2012) (“City of N.Y.”); Elec.
Contractors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 35 A.3d 188, 208 (Conn. 2012); Minn.
Chapter of ABC, Inc. v. Cty. of St. Louis, 825 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Minn. 1993).
166. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1016 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held in that the PLA in Rancho Santiago constituted
government market participation not subject to preemption by the NLRA). The
Rancho Santiago Community College District (“District”) contracted with the
Los Angeles and Orange Counties BCTC and required a PLA as a contract
condition. Id. The PLA required all contractors and subcontractors to contribute
to union benefit programs, required workers to pay dues, prohibited labor
disruptions, required an apprenticeship program for District residents, and
maximized opportunities for minority-owned and women-owned businesses. Id.
In response, non-union members sued in March 2004. Id. The District Court
held that government was acting as a market participant and the PLA was
exempt from preemption. Id. To determine whether the action is “tantamount
to regulation,” the Ninth Circuit looked to the Fifth Circuit’s two-prong test:
does the action reflect the entity’s own interest in the efficient procurement of
needed goods and services; or does the action’s narrow scope address a specific
proprietary problem or merely encourage a general policy? Id. The Ninth Circuit
held this test offers two ways a state can prove its actions fall under the
exception: by affirmatively showing its interest in efficient procurement; or
pointing to the narrow scope of the action to prove it is not regulatory. Id.
167. City of N.Y., 678 F.3d at 191-92; see Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1025
(quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031,
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limited to economic goals, like timely completion and costs; they
extend to other goals including health, safety, and environment. 168
The court failed to be persuaded by the argument that the primary
purpose of PLAs was to preference unions.169 Instead, the court
found the government used PLAs to serve legitimate proprietary
goals: containing costs, optimizing productivity, and boosting
economy.170 The argument that no private party would enter into a
PLA with so few benefits also failed to persuade the court; rather,
the court reasoned that Congress would never intend for the market
participant exception to apply only when the state gets a “good
deal.”171 The court held that a “good deal” does not determine the
proprietary nature of a PLA.172
The Second Circuit followed a similar analysis: that legitimate
state purposes for efficient procurement are not limited to economic
goals.173 A contractor argued that the practice of conditioning a bid
on a PLA was anti-competitive and prevented him from bidding on
the project because doing so violated his prior agreements with
other unions.174 The court found that this problem was “entirely
self-inflicted,” and that the contractor was free to work on non-PLA
projects or renegotiate its prior agreements.175 The court noted that
the difference between non-union or contractors in agreements with
other unions did not alter the basic market participant analysis. 176
Similar to the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit
also rejected the arguments that PLAs were anti-competitive and

1046 (9th Cir.2007) (efficient procurement does not mean “cheap” procurement
– it means “procurement that serves the state’s purpose”)).
168. Federal preemption of state action is a question of congressional intent.
Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1022; see Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 498 F.3d at 1039–
40; see also Gould, 475 U.S. at 289 (demonstrating that in field preemption,
federal laws always preempt state laws). Implied preemption prevents states
from acting as regulators. Id. The market participant exception overcomes any
state action that may frustrate congressional purpose. Id. A state action falls
under the market participant exception when it directly participates in the
market by purchasing goods or services and its actions are not “tantamount to
regulation.” Id.
169. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1026.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1026-27.
172. Id. at 1027.
173. City of N.Y., 678 F.3d at 187.
174. Id. (holding that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, persuaded by
both Cardinal Towing and Rancho Santiago, upheld PLAs in public contracts
under the market participant exception). In 2009, the City of New York (“City”)
entered into a PLA estimated to cover about half of the construction projects
over the next five years with BCTC of Greater New York and Vicinity (“NY
BCTC”). Id. The PLA required all signatory contractors to hire a minimum of
88% workers through NY BCTC. Id. One contractor entered into an agreement
with a non-NY BCTC affiliated union, making it difficult for them to comply
with the City’s PLA. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 189.
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costly.177
The government exercises discretion in determining the lowest
responsible bidder and that valuation is not solely determined by
price.178 As a purchaser, the government may enter into PLAs at its
discretion.179 Government discretion in awarding a contract is based
on the best bid and not limited to the lowest dollar bid. 180 Cost
considerations should not be leveraged above all other
considerations or be the determinative factor. 181 Certain factors
include ensuring predictable costs and steady labor should not be
limited to private entities.182 Increased costs by contracting with
unions can eventually lead to overall savings when the result is
avoiding labor disruptions and maintaining quality laborers. 183
PLAs can be extremely beneficial when a project increases in size
or complexity.184
3. Market Participant Exception: Narrow Scope or
Tantamount to Regulation?
While noting efficient procurement as the first prong of the
market participant exception, the Ninth Circuit in Rancho Santiago
explored the second prong of the Cardinal Towing test which
requires a narrow scope.185 When a proprietary interest becomes
“tantamount to regulation,” the goal is no longer narrow and is
subject to preemption.186 The PLA in Rancho Santiago was limited
by a three-year term and only to construction projects costing over
$200,000, which were paid for by a fund approved by voters.187 The
177. See id. at 190-91 (describing “acting like a proprietor” does not limit
state action to the narrow goal of minimizing costs regardless of consequences.)
As private owners may work with familiar or larger entities, government
proprietors are afforded similar discretion. Id. This reflects continued economic
rationality. Id. The court disagreed that the government must choose the lowest
dollar amount. Id.
178. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 35 A.3d 188, 208 (Conn. 2012);
see also Minn. Chapter of ABC, Inc. v. Cty. of St. Louis, 825 F. Supp. 238, 244
(D. Minn. 1993) (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 49
N.W.2d 197, 201 (1951)).
179. ABC of R.I., Inc. v. Dep't of Admin., 787 A.2d 1179, 1189 (R.I. 2002);
Callahan, 713 N.E.2d at 961.
180. Enertech Elec., Inc. v. Mahoning Cty. Com'rs, 85 F.3d 257, 260 (6th Cir.
1996) (citing Cedar Bay Constr., Inc. v. City of Fremont, 552 N.E.2d 202, 205
(Ohio 1990)).
181. Elec. Contractors, Inc., 35 A.3d at 205; Connecticut ABC v. City of
Hartford, 740 A.2d 813, 825 (Conn. 1999) (“City of Hartford”).
182. ABC of R.I., Inc., 787 A.2d at 1189.
183. Elec. Contractors, Inc., 35 A.3d at 205; City of Hartford, 740 A.2d at
825.
184. ABC of R.I., 787 A.2d at 1189.
185. Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693; Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1025
(citing Gould, 475 U.S. at 289).
186. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1025 (citing Gould, 475 U.S. at 289).
187. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1016 (detailing that the funds were
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court compared the narrowness of this PLA to the substantially
similar PLA in Boston Harbor, which involved a project limited in
time and amount, albeit longer.188 The Ninth Circuit concluded the
government satisfied both prongs of the Cardinal Towing market
participant test and its PLA was not preempted by the NLRA.189
The court further found no indication of a regulatory purpose
unrelated to the contractual obligations, such as rewards or
sanctions for party conduct.190
When a public contract’s PLA is challenged, a court may
require the government show the PLA furthers the purpose of the
competitive bidding.191 A sufficiently narrow PLA will be upheld if
“a project is of such size, duration, timing, and complexity that the
goals of the competitive bidding statute cannot otherwise be
achieved and the record demonstrates that the awarding authority
undertook a careful, reasoned process to conclude that the adoption
of a PLA furthered the statutory goals.”192 In analyzing the
“narrowness” prong of the Cardinal Towing test, more than a
reasonable basis must be shown for inclusion of a PLA in public
contracts.193
It is strange, then, that the Louisiana District Court declined
to follow the binding test of its Appellate Court and instead relied
on persuasive material in the D.C. and Sixth Circuit Courts to
uphold a blanket ban in Jindal.194 In 2011, the Louisiana
legislature passed Act 134, which prohibited bidding documents in
construction contracts paid by government funds to require
PLAs.195 The union council AFL-CIO,196 who regularly negotiated
PLAs with the government, sued Governor Jindal alleging the Act
approved by voters in Ballot Measure E in 2002).
188. Id. at 1028 (citing Boston Harbor at 221-22); see also Brief for
Petitioners at 7, Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (No. 91–261), 1992 WL
511837:
Like the District's PSA, the Boston Harbor agreement recognized one
exclusive bargaining agent, specified dispute-resolution mechanisms,
required all employees to become union members within seven days of
their employment, required use of the union's hiring halls to supply the
labor force, prohibited strikes for the term of the agreement, bound all
contractors and subcontractors to the agreement, and prescribed the
benefits that workers would receive for the duration of the project. Id.
189. Rancho Santiago, 623 F.3d at 1022.
190. Id. at 1026.
191. John T. Callahan & Sons v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 961 (1999).
192. Id.
193. Associated General Contractors v. N.Y. State Thruway Authority, 666
N.E.2d 185, 190 (1996); ABC of R.I., 787 A.2d at 1186.
194. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 587.
195. Act 134 was codified into LA. STAT. ANN. § 38:2225.5 (2014).
196. “Plaintiff, Southeast Louisiana Building and Construction Trades
Council, AFL-CIO, is an unincorporated association comprised of member labor
organizations or building and construction trade unions throughout Southeast
Louisiana.” Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 587.
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was unconstitutional and unenforceable.197 ABC intervened on
their own behalf.198 The union argued the NLRA preempted the
Act’s prohibition of PLAs on all public construction projects. 199
ABC and Governor Jindal argued that the Act was narrow and
proprietary with the purpose of fostering competition in
government projects.200 They also argued that the limited Act
banned only public entities from entering into PLAs on construction
projects and not contracts between the government and private
entities.201 Instead of relying on the binding market participant test
laid out in Cardinal Towing, the court accepted ABC’s argument
and allowed a blanket ban of PLAs under both the efficient
procurement and narrow scope prongs.202 In a vague explanation
determining a regulatory purpose, the court inexplicitly reasoned it
should look primarily at the facial objective and not “search for an
impermissible motive where a permissible purpose is apparent.” 203
In most court cases, the NLRA preempts state action when the
action is regulatory in nature because it frustrates the purpose of
the NLRA.204 Government proprietary actions fall under the market
participant exception, which requires efficient procurement and a
narrow scope.205
The Supreme Court test regarding PLAs rests on whether the
government is acting as a regulator or proprietor. When acting as a
regulator, the NLRA preempts state action. However, when the
state acts as a market participant, the state is not preempted by the
NLRA. Presidents have influenced the use of PLAs over several
decades, with the tide of support changing dependent on the party
in power. States have also influenced the use of PLAs, with many
states rejecting PLAs, some states supporting PLAs, and the rest
197. Id.
198. Id. (referring to ABC as the Louisiana Chapter, the New Orleans-Bayou
Chapter, and the Pelican Chapter of ABC, Inc.).
199. Id. at 592.
200. Id. at 595.
201. Id. at 594.
202. Id. (citing Gould 475 U.S. at 291).
203. “Federal preemption doctrine evaluates what legislation does, not why
legislators voted for it or what political coalition led to its enactment.” Jindal,
107 F. Supp. 3d at 603 (citing City of N.Y., 678 F.3d at 191 and quoting Lavin,
431 F.3d at 1007 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
204. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 592; Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S.
724, 747 (1985); Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps & Bartenders Int’l Union Local
54, 468 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1984).
205. Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693 (describing that before November
1995, the City of Bedford, Texas (“City”) permitted towing services to
individually tow vehicles, store the vehicles at their respective lots, and then
owner would ultimately pay for the service). In November, the City opened
towing services for bidding, requiring short response times and access to a
wrecker. Id. Three bidders applied and the contract was awarded. Id. One
bidder failed to meet the requirements and demanded the City re-bid the
contract. Id. The bidder still failed to meet the requirements on re-bid and sued
for discrimination. Id.
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remaining silent on the issue. Hereafter, the analysis will discuss
whether a blanket prohibition falls under regulation or the market
participant exception.

III. ANALYSIS
This section lays out various issues including separation of
powers and preemption. First, this section discusses whether the
state legislation is within the purview of federal laws or if certain
states are in conflict. Next, this section analyzes Supreme Court
and lower court rulings regarding NLRA preemption. Finally, this
section breaks down decisions from state and federal courts and
analyzes the current political and economic issues.

A. Do the Executive Orders Preempt the States?
1. Youngstown Analysis
Under the Youngstown analysis, presidential executive orders
regarding PLAs should fall within the second prong: where
Congress has enacted legislation. 206 Presidents have minimum
authority when Congress addressed any specific issue.207 Unions
that oppose executive orders argue that Congress specifically
carved out an exception in the construction industry for PLAs; any
executive order contrary to the NLRA lacks authority. 208 The
President would counter such union arguments by stating the
executive branch retains the authority to narrow the scope of
PLAs.209
Obama’s current executive order encourages federal agencies
to use project labor agreements on any construction project over $25
million; however, it does not require PLA use on any project.210
Because President Obama used the word “may” in his executive
order, many states have issued statutes, constitutional
amendments, or executive orders under their dormant commerce
power.211 To date, none have been overturned based on conflict with
the executive order.212 One state, Kentucky, passed a statute that
206. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Exec. Order 13,502, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (2009).
211. Id. The states that have passed constitutional amendments, or
executive orders after 2009 in alphabetical order include: Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. A Total of 24
States Restrict Government Mandated Project Labor Agreements, supra note
119.
212. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28.
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fits squarely within the executive order, but leaves discretion about
any pre-hire agreements to its General Assembly.213 This section of
the statute only applies to construction projects over $25 million
and an area where the General Assembly might have an interest.
2. Differences Between President William Clinton’s and
President George W. Bush’s Executive Orders
In contrast to Obama’s executive order, Clinton’s executive
order conflicted with the NLRA and the D.C. Circuit Court declared
his order unconstitutional. Clinton’s executive order was ruled
unconstitutional, not because it overreached into the states’
authority, but because the requiring of PLAs on certain projects was
contrary to the NLRA.214 The Clinton executive order prohibited the
government from contracting with businesses who hired permanent
labor replacements when their workers went on strike.215
After President George W. Bush was elected, he executed a
facially neutral order that did not “require or prohibit” the
government from entering into a PLA. 216 Although the language in
the Bush executive order does not specifically undercut
congressional policy regarding labor and management as
exemplified in the NLRA, it still limited an area in which Congress
was active and the provisions fell under the Machinists doctrine of
preemption it sought to regulate – activity that Congress intended
to remain unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces. 217
A number of courts have determined that the facially neutral
language “neither prohibit nor require” is regulatory in effect. 218
Some courts still question the legality of Bush’s executive order
after its revocation, arguing that its ban of PLAs violates § 8(f) of
the NLRA.219
213. Public-private partnership delivery method of awarding state contracts
for capital construction projects, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.077 (8) and (10)(c).
214. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322.
215. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322.
216. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 32.
217. Brown, 554 U.S. at 77; Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140; Gould, 475 U.S. at
286 (stating “the NLRA preempts these provisions because they ‘regulate
activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or prohibits.’”).
218. Ohio State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of
Commissioners, 781 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio 2002) (“Ohio”).
219. Id. at 966 (quoting Boston Harbor):
It does not seem to us possible to deny that the President's Executive
Order [in this case] seeks to set a broad [labor] policy. The President has,
of course, acted to set procurement policy rather than labor policy. But
the former is quite explicitly based--and would have to be based--on his
views of the latter. Whatever one's views on the issue, it surely goes to
the heart of United States labor relations policy. It cannot be equated to
the ad hoc contracting decision made by MWRA in seeking to clean up
Boston Harbor.

2019]

Project Labor Agreements

563

In considering whether an executive order exceeds the scope of
the president’s authority, courts look to the Youngstown analysis.
Because a number of executive orders have focused on project labor
agreements in the construction industry, it is important to know
whether the President has exceeded the executive authority. While
only Clinton’s executive order has been revoked by a court, incoming
presidents issue executive orders in line with their political parties.
This back-and-forth pattern concerns many in the construction
industry, especially those dealing with contracts that exceed a
president’s term or progress into the term of a politically-polar
president.

B. Total Bans On PLAs Are Overly Broad and Should
Be Preempted
Since the Supreme Court’s rulings, states have sought various
ways to affect PLAs.220 Legislative efforts in cases involving project
labor agreements have generally been upheld.221 Unfortunately, the
point at which the primary goal of the governmental action
encourages labor policy rather than a narrow proprietary goal is
unclear.222 When the facts of the case resemble Boston Harbor,
courts have found contracts over projects of limited duration not to
be preempted by the NLRA.223 When the facts of the case resemble
Gould, courts have found preemption when government entities
seek to advance general societal goals rather than narrow
proprietary interests through government spending and
contracting power.224
In Reich, the D.C. Circuit Court struck President Clinton’s
executive order which barred the federal government from
contracting with employers who hire permanent replacements
during a lawful strike.225 The executive order overtly favored unions
and attempted to set a broad pro-union policy affecting millions of
American workers.226 Because the overbroad executive order waded
into policymaking, the court ruled it unconstitutional. 227 The D.C.
Circuit Court opined that “[s]urely, the result would have been
entirely different, given the [reasoning in Boston Harbor], if
Massachusetts had passed a general law or the Governor had issued
an Executive Order requiring all construction contractors doing

220. City of N.Y., 678 F.3d at 191.
221. Youssef v. Tishman Const. Corp., 744 F.3d 821 (2d Cir. 2014); Balfour
Beatty Constr. v. Md. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 220 Md. App. 334, 364 (2014).
222. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 601.
223. Id. at 600.
224. Id.
225. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1339 (citing Exec. Order No. 12954, 60 Fed. Reg.
13023 (Mar. 10, 1995)).
226. Id. at 1337.
227. Id.
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business with the state to enter into collective bargaining
agreements . . . containing [PLAs].”228
1. Allbaugh, Snyder, and Ohio Explored
While some courts have found a “blanket prohibition” crosses
the line between spending power and regulatory power, 229 other
courts disagree.230 In 2002, the D.C. Circuit Court declined to follow
precedent in deciding Allbaugh.231 The court looked to whether the
executive order conflicted with the NLRA, which depended on
whether the government acted as a regulator or a proprietor.232 The
court held that “because the Executive Order does not address the
use of PLAs on projects unrelated to those in which the Government
has a proprietary interest, the Executive Order established no
condition that can be characterized as ‘regulatory.’”233
The D.C. Circuit Court further found the government acted as
a proprietor when it used its own funds to ensure the most efficient
use of those funds and that the government, similar to a private
owner, is motivated to maximize its benefits.234 The court held that
the government’s action in issuing a blanket ban was consistent
with private owners’ actions.235 The court further explained that the
government crosses the line into regulation when it controls conduct
that is unrelated to contractual obligations in construction
projects.236 When the prohibition extends only to projects funded by
the government and not to unrelated projects, the government has
a proprietary interest and the executive order is lawful.237
Similarly in Snyder, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld

228. Id.
229. Idaho BCTC v. Wasden, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1163 (D. Idaho 2011)
rev’d by Idaho BCTC v. Inland Pacific Chapter of ABC, 616 F. App'x 319, 320
(9th Cir. 2015); ABC of R.I., Inc. v. City of Providence, 108 F. Supp. 2d 73, 81
(D.R.I. 2000); Ohio, 781 N.E.2d at 968.
230. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 29; Snyder, 729 F.3d at 574 (discussing the
Governor's executive order prohibiting state and political subdivisions from
entering into PLAs on state-funded construction projects was proprietary and
not preempted by the NLRA); George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.,
137 N.J. 8 (N.J. 1994) (finding by the New Jersey Supreme Court that state was
acting as proprietor or purchaser of labor in construction industry when
prohibiting a project labor agreement specification in public contracts).
231. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 29.
232. Id. at 34.
233. Id. at 37.
234. Id. at 35.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 36 (citing Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 228-29: “A condition that
the Government imposes in awarding a contract or in funding a project is
regulatory only when, as the Supreme Court explained in Boston Harbor, it
‘addresse[s] employer conduct unrelated to the employer's performance of
contractual obligations to the [Government]’”).
237. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 36.
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a blanket ban on PLAs.238 In 2011, Michigan passed the Fair and
Open Competition in Governmental Construction Act. 239 Two AFLCIO unions240 filed suit against Governor Snyder and the District
Court found in favor of the unions. 241 While Governor Snyder
appealed the District Court’s decision, 242 the Michigan legislature
amended the Act to replace the absolute bar of PLAs on projects
that had government spending and add language allowing a
voluntary PLA.243 The state’s purpose was to “provide for more
economical, nondiscriminatory, neutral, and efficient procurement
of construction-related goods and services by this state” as well as
“providing for fair and open competition.”244
The Sixth Circuit found the Act, as amended, to be proprietary
and not regulatory: “[t]he law’s effect is limited to forbidding
governmental units from entering into PLAs and then forcing terms
and conditions on bidders . . . Such a limited action is similar to
those found to be proprietary by the Supreme Court, this court, and
other circuits.”245 The court looked at the Act’s legislative history for
intent – to improve efficiency in government projects, not to
regulate: “the [A]ct specifically states it is intended to provide for
more economical, nondiscriminatory, neutral and efficient
procurement of construction related goods and services by this
state.”246
The court suggested that if the government wanted to
encourage PLA use, it could just give all subcontracting power to
one general contractor or allow contractors to voluntarily enter into
a PLA when it is the most efficient way to proceed. 247 The Act
238. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 576.
239. Michigan’s Fair and Open Competition in Gov’t Constr. Act, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 423.14 (2011).
240. The two unions who sued were the Mich. BCTC, AFL-CIO and Genesee,
Lapeer, Shiawassee BCTC, AFL-CIO.
241. Snyder, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (Moore, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the court rejected the Governor’s argument that the state was acting as a
proprietor and found that the law was regulatory in nature and preempted by
§§ 7 & 8 of the NLRA). In order to act as a proprietor, the government would
consider PLAs on a case-by-case basis and not issue a blanket prohibition. Id.
242. Snyder, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
243. Contract for construction, repair, remodeling, or demolition of facility;
prohibitions concerning bid specifications, project agreements, or other
controlling documents, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 408.875 (2012) and
Agreement with labor organization, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 408.878 (2012).
244. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 576.
245. Id. at 577.
246. Id at 578.
247. Id. (citing 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 238 § 2 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV § 408.872 (2002)) Senator Moolenaar explained that the act is intended to
“guarantee [] the equal opportunity and fiscal accountability that taxpayers
expect from government” (S. Journal 48, 96 th Leg., at 867 (Mich. 2012))).
Senator Gleason, opposing the act, argued that the act constitutes a terrible
decision to “go cheap on labor” because it would lead to the use of lesser-skilled
workers and shabbily built projects. Id. He noted it would be better to have
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limited its blanket ban of PLAs only on public projects, which would
not be considered too broad if a private contractor issued the ban;
therefore, the court considered it narrow enough to fall under the
market participant exception.248 The court reasoned that this
government action was more akin to Boston Harbor, because the
legislative intent was efficient procurement.249 Unlike the statutes
in Gould and Brown, the Michigan statute did not facially evidence
regulatory intent.250
By contrast, in Cuyahoga County, the Ohio Supreme Court
found a state statute preempted by the NLRA, using precedent that
the Allbaugh and Snyder courts failed to follow.251 The statute
prohibited the government from conditioning public projects on
PLAs, as it had commonly done so previously.252 After enacting the
statute, the government notified the union it would no longer be
conditioning projects on PLAs.253 The union brought suit against
the government regarding the constitutionality of the state
statute.254 The trial court found the Supremacy Clause invalidated
the statute and permanently enjoined its enforcement.255 The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding the statute did not facially, or by
application, prohibit a government agency to enter into a PLA, but
instead only prohibited PLAs with objectionable terms. 256 It also
held the statute was not preempted by the NLRA.257 Two other
courts have followed this logic. 258 The Supreme Court of Ohio
reversed, citing Ohio Governor Taft:
I am concerned that this legislation would not survive a
constitutional challenge based on the supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Our legal research shows the courts have, in the past,
found that the regulation of project labor agreements is a federal
“high standards and high qualifications, not low cost.” Id. at 866-67.
248. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 578.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 579.
251. Ohio, 781 N.E.2d 951.
252. Id. at 953-54; Preamble to 1999 Am.H.B. No. 101.
253. Ohio, 781 N.E.2d at 954.
254. Id at 953.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Jindal, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 594; see also Cent. Iowa Bldg. & Const.
Trades Council v. Branstad, 4:11-CV-00202-JAJ-CFB, 2011 WL 4004652, at *1
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 7, 2011). Two Iowa Trades Councils (collectively referred to as
“BCTC”) sued Governor Branstad who signed Exec. Order 69 which prohibited
Iowa state officials from entering into PLAs on state-funded construction
projects. Branstad, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 104871 at 1. The Southern District of
Iowa held that, after reviewing Boston Harbor’s analysis, Governor Branstad’s
executive order 69 was not preempted by the NLRA because prohibiting PLAs
on state-funded projects is a valid proprietary decision. Id at 29. Neither the
Garmon nor Machinists preemptions apply here because the court found the
State of Iowa was not regulating businesses through the issuance of the
executive order. Id.
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responsibility under the National Labor Relations Act and that the
state is therefore preempted from legislating in this area.259

The NLRA preempts blanket prohibition against the enforcement
of PLAs on public works.260
Although the Ohio Court of Appeals found the statute to be
facially neutral, and the statute’s restrictions did not effectively
prohibit the government from entering into a PLA, the Ohio
Supreme Court disagreed.261 The court looked at the legislative
history, including the statutes sponsor’s testimony for the bill before
the House Commerce and Labor Committee that “[t]his important
legislation will prohibit so-called ‘project labor agreements’ in the
State of Ohio.”262 The Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute
expressly prohibited “the very sort of labor agreement that
Congress explicitly authorized and expected frequently to find.” 263
In essence, the facially neutral statute was discriminatory in
purpose and effect, which frustrates congressional purpose. 264
2. Allbaugh and Snyder Misconstrue Supreme Court
Decisions and Ignore the Cardinal Towing Test
The Allbaugh and Snyder majority opinions fundamentally
misconstrue critical aspects of the Supreme Court decisions in
Boston Harbor, Gould, and Brown. In Gould, the Supreme Court
stated, “[w]e agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that by
flatly prohibiting state purchases from repeat labor law violators
Wisconsin ‘simply is not functioning as a private purchaser of
services . . . for all practical purposes, Wisconsin's debarment
scheme is tantamount to regulation.’”265 The breadth of an outright
ban reaches too far outside the proprietary aspect of government
ownership in a project.266 Prohibiting PLAs through neutral
language means that the State is imposing a much harsher sanction
than Congress intended.267 These Wisconsin laws not only advance
a broad policy statement, they actually regulate conduct.268
However, both federal courts in Allbaugh and Snyder upheld
the blanket ban of PLAs because the PLAs were only being
prohibited on projects that used government funds, where the
government was acting in a proprietary way and neither the
259. Ohio, 781 N.E.2d at 954 (citing Communications Release (June 30,
1999), Office of the Governor).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 958.
262. Id. (citing first Ron Young (R-Leroy) the sponsor of Am.H.B. No. 101).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289 (citing Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of
Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 750 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1984)).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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executive order nor the Michigan legislation established any
regulatory conditions.269 The D.C. Circuit Court in Allbaugh stated
that imposing a condition when awarding a contract or funding a
project is regulatory only when it addresses conduct unrelated to
government’s contractual obligations. 270 However, his language
from Boston Harbor indicated other non-key factors.271 The
Supreme Court used this language to rebut respondent’s argument
that state action is preempted even when acting as a proprietor. 272
The two main factors the Supreme Court relied on were distilled in
Cardinal Towing: efficient procurement and the narrow scope of the
action.273
Allbaugh ignored the narrow prong of Cardinal Towing’s
Boston Harbor test: “[t]here simply is no logical justification for
holding that if an executive order establishes a consistent practice
regarding the use of PLAs, it is regulator even though the only
decisions governed by the executive order are those that the federal
government makes as a market participant.” 274 Rather, the overly
broad presidential executive order applies to all public construction
contracts.275 Secondly, the executive order removes the discretion of
the individual governmental agency, even if the state might find
“efficient procurement” in not choosing the lowest dollar bid.276 The
Bush executive order should be held to the same standard of the
Clinton executive order because, as courts have found, it has
facially neutral language promoting a broad regulatory policy in an
effectual and purposeful way.277
The Michigan Act in Snyder also fails under both prongs of the
Cardinal Towing test.278 Instead of following binding precedent of
the Supreme Court and followed by many circuits, the majority in
Snyder followed the contradictory reasoning of a single panel of the
D.C. Circuit Court.279 First, the court forgoes any analysis showing
269. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289.
270. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28; Snyder, 729 F.3d 572.
271. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 28.
272. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 587 (Moore, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 35.
275. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 587 (Moore, J., dissenting).
276. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 35.
277. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322.
278. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 576.
279. Id. at 584 (Moore, J., dissenting):
Instead of following this binding Supreme Court precedent—as well as
the decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits;
two panels of the D.C. Circuit; and a decision of this Court in Petrey v.
City of Toledo, 246 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds
by City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424
(2002), 122 S. Ct. 2226, 153 L. Ed. 2d 430 —the majority has chosen to
adopt a standard set forth by a single panel of the D.C. Circuit that
directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent.
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that a blanket ban promotes and reflects each entity’s own interest
in efficient procurement.280 Second, an industry-wide ban of PLAs
furthers a general policy to isolate unions from bidding in
construction projects.281 Contrary to the Supreme Court’s rationale
in Boston Harbor, the Sixth Circuit upheld an overly broad Act that
sought to set a broad policy governing the behavior of numerous
American workers.282 Rather, the court focuses its analysis of the
narrow prong on the actions between private parties, which the Act
does not regulate.283 Not only does the court misstate the issue, but
it is misguided in its reasoning.284 The issue is whether the
government is precluded from entering into a PLA. 285 “When the
right at issue is wholly precluded by the action at issue, it is hard
to understand how the action can be construed as narrow with
respect to its effect on the right.” 286 If every court looked to what a
law does not regulate, instead of what the law does, then every state
action could be construed as narrow. 287
3. The Laws May Be Facially Neutral, But They Are
Discriminatory in Effect
The Allbaugh and Snyder courts decided that the facially
neutral language of “neither prohibit nor require” is a central part
of the legal analysis, showing neutrality in the law and not
discrimination.288 Snyder cites Lavin “[f]ederal preemption doctrine
evaluates what legislation does, not why legislators voted for it or
what political coalition led to its enactment.”289 However, neither
the Allbaugh nor the Snyder courts cease the analysis after
determining broad neutrality, instead of evaluating the legislators’
efforts or the motive behind it.290
Although many states pass statutes, constitutional
amendments, and executive orders with facially neutral language,
such as “neither require nor prohibit,” these laws are discriminatory
in effect. Passed in Republican states with anti-union agendas, the
effect further isolates unions in states that do not require employees
to pay the union to receive its benefits (“Right to Work Doctrine”).291

280. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 576.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 585-86 (Moore, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 590 (Moore, J., dissenting).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Snyder, 729 F.3d at 590.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 592 (Moore, J., dissenting).
289. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28; Snyder, 729 F.3d 572.
290. Id.
291. Many of states that passed Right to Work legislation are also anti-PLA:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
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Banning PLAs essentially ousts unions from construction
projects.292 Although union labor costs more,293 by either increasing
the total costs of the project or cut into profits, union employees
nonetheless receive greater benefits.294 The Bureau of Labor
statistics reports that in construction, union members earned $1099
per week in 2015 opposed to nonunion employees who made only
$743.295 In addition, unions provide better benefits which are also
included in construction costs.296 Many federally-funded public
projects, or projects with significant government subsidies, require
union workers and Davis-Bacon prevailing wage, which eliminates
the union problem of being undercut on price.297
Many unions require their members to be extensively trained,
which leads to owners benefitting from the qualified, safer, and
more productive workers.298 Contractors who want a large-scale job
done quickly and safely rely on a skilled workforce.299 The New York
Committee for Occupational Safety and Health reported that 79%
of job site accidents where a worker fell and died were at nonunion
sites.300 In addition, the report reveals that 90% of city construction
companies in OSHA’s Severe Violator Enforcement Program were
non-union.301 If a project isn’t done correctly, liability issues
arise.302 Although a project may be the cheaper bid does not mean
it will cost an owner the least money.303 These unforeseen
ramifications are part of the decision-making process by the state
and should be left to state discretion on a case-by-case basis.304
4. Government Bodies Are Not Private Actors for a Reason
The Supreme Court in Gould clearly stated that states must be
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Button, supra note 101.
292. Kim Slowly, Construction unions: Headed for extinction or poised for a
resurgence?, CONSTR. DIVE (Mar. 31, 2016), www.constructiondive.com/news/
construction-unions-headed-for-extinction-or-poised-for-a-resurgence/416545/.
293. See Shane Hedmond, Average Hourly Wage of Union and Non-Union
Construction Workers, CONSTR.JUNKIE (Mar. 28, 2018), www.construction
junkie.com/blog/2018/3/25/average-hourly-wage-of-union-and-non-unionconstruction-workers (providing data showing union workers with a higher
hourly wage across the United States).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. (including two private construction projects – Apple Campus 2
“spaceship” in Cupertino, California and Tesla’s gigafactory in Reno, Nevada).
298. Id.
299. See Slowly, supra note 285 (citing the “two-day rule” where union crews
pour concrete and complete a high-rise floor once every two days).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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held to a higher standard than private actors in areas governed by
the NLRA.305 Asking what state action the Commerce Clause would
permit without the NLRA is entirely different from asking what
States may do while the NLRA is in place. 306 States are treated
differently by the NLRA because governments are fundamentally
different from private actors.307 For example, private parties may
regulate by banning a supplier or union from all future work and
can act on an across-the-board basis without becoming regulators
or their action becoming “tantamount to regulation.” 308 Government
action, on the other hand, absolutely can cross the line and become
“tantamount to regulation.”309 The Supreme Court relies on this
fundamental principle in Boston Harbor, Gould, and Brown.310
A State may act identical to a private actor when it limits its
action to only participating in the market.311 Otherwise, the State
would be permitted to regulate within the NLRA’s protected zone
because a private actor may do so. Both Allbaugh and Snyder
fundamentally miss this distinction in reasoning that the
government, similar to a private owner, has the authority and
interest in issuing nationwide or statewide bans.312
This flawed analysis has long-lasting implications. First, as
evidenced by our two-party system, a national- or state-wide ban
detrimentally effects one party to the advantage of the other. Each
new presidential executive order shifts labor policy, leaving
uncertainty and instability throughout all levels of government. In
response, many states have enacted laws to circumvent shifting
party politics. However, upholding any state bans in the face of the
congressionally-preempted labor policy is contrary to the basic
constitutional separation of powers principle.313 Second, the ban
305. Gould, 475 U.S. at 282.
306. Id. at 290.
307. Id.
308. Lavin, 431 F.3d at 1007.
309. Id.
310. Gould, 475 U.S. at 290; Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 222; Brown, 554
U.S. at 63.
311. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 222.
312. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28; Snyder, 729 F.3d 572.
313. Nat. Conf. of State Legis., Separation of Powers -- An Overview, NAT.
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS., www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/
separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2019):
The traditional characterizations of the powers of the branches of
American government are:
* The legislative branch is responsible for enacting the laws of the state
and appropriating the money necessary to operate the government.
* The executive branch is responsible for implementing and
administering the public policy enacted and funded by the legislative
branch.
* The judicial branch is responsible for interpreting the constitution and
laws and applying their interpretations to controversies brought before
it. Id.
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does not take into consideration the areas where the governmental
entity uses its discretion to determine a PLA is necessary and
instead revokes the discretion and implements the ideology of the
current party in power. The local agencies that work with the
federal government on these federally-funded projects should
continue to exert their authoritative discretion on a project-byproject basis.

C. “Grey Area” between Market Participant and
Regulator
1. Seventh Circuit Clarifies the “Grey Area”
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in two cases that
the government fell under the market participant exception.314 The
state toll highway authority in Colfax demanded that contractors
must comply with a multi-project PLA in order to be approved to
remove asbestos from public buildings. 315 Like a private entity, the
government can demand a contractor to abide by a multi-project
labor agreement in an attempt to keep labor peace. 316 Because it
was aware of conflicts between a contractor and signatory unions,
the government validly contracted with companies who were willing
to sign the PLA.317
The Seventh Circuit held in Lavin, that conditioning grants on
PLAs to specific projects is permissible under the market
participant doctrine.318 Illinois subsidized ethanol plants and
conditioned grants on a PLA and a non-union contractor filed suit
and alleged that the conditional offer of a subsidy was a form of
regulation.319 Courts have generally held that conditions on
national grants to states are not regulatory, because the national
government cannot direct a state to pass or enforce a law and that
the state decides whether to take the money and obligate itself to
the conditions.320 Conditions on spending become regulation when
they affect conduct other than the financed project. 321 “Illinois is
concerned exclusively with subsidized renewable-fuels projects
contract for labor; its condition is project specific” and has not
engaged in regulation preempted by the NLRA. 322 Lavin is followed

314. Colfax Corp. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 79 F.3d 631 (7th Cir.
1996) (“Colfax”) and Lavin, 431 F.3d 1004.
315. Colfax, 79 F.3d at 635.
316. Id.
317. Id
318. Lavin, 431 F.3d at 1007.
319. Id.
320. Id. (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); S. Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
321. Lavin, 431 F.3d at 1006 (citing Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986)).
322. Id.
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by the District of Rhode Island. 323
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Metropolitan
Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, the
NLRA preempted Chapter 31 of the General Ordinances of
Milwaukee County, which required PLAs on contracts concerning
transportation and services for the elderly and disabled. 324 Gould
illustrates the principle that spending power may not be used as a
pretext for regulating labor relations. 325 To comply with this PLA,
contractors would have to extensively change the way they do
business.326 For example, contractors would have to divide a
workforce that performed identical work into those governed by a
PLA and those that are not based on different customers. 327
Therefore, the PLA is no longer limited to the scope of certain
projects, but is having a spillover effect on private contracts. 328
Similar to the analysis in Gould, a purchasing rule determining how
contractors must manage labor relations in all aspects of their
business is preempted by the NLRA.329
2. Line Between Proprietor and Regulator
The pivotal distinction between Lavin and Milwaukee is the
narrow prong of the Cardinal Towing test.330 The grant in Lavin is
narrowly tailored to projects in a specific area whereas the
ordinance in Milwaukee, although narrow in language, spread to
private contracts and effected private businesses. 331 The ordinance
made it impracticable for business owners to have separate
transportation fleets for private and public contracts. 332 The
ordinance was overly broad even though the language was facially
neutral because it infringed on public contracts and, therefore, the

323. In 2000, the United States District Court of Rhode Island determined
that while tax benefits may subsidize a particular industry, a tax exemption
does not fall within the market participant exception. The government acted as
a regulator and not as a market participant when it required PLAs on private
construction projects receiving favorable tax treatment and this action is
preempted by the NLRA. City of Providence, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 82; see also
Hudson Cty. BCTC v. City of Jersey City, 960 F.Supp. 823, 833 (D.N.J. 1996)
(analyzing that a city which enacted an ordinance requiring businesses to make
good faith efforts to hire a majority of residents was engaged in regulatory
activity and the market participation doctrine did not apply to preclude NLRA
preemption).
324. Metro. Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. Milwaukee Cty., 431 F.3d 277,
277-78 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Milwaukee Cty.”).
325. Milwaukee Cty., 431 F.3d at 279.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Gould, 475 U.S. at 289.
330. Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693.
331. Lavin, 431 F.3d at 1006; Milwaukee Cty., 431 F.3d at 279.
332. Milwaukee Cty., 431 F.3d at 279.
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government was no longer acting as a proprietor. 333 Because the
Milwaukee ordinance was overly broad, it was preempted by the
NLRA.334 The Seventh Circuit more clearly defines areas in which
the government action becomes “tantamount to regulation.” 335

D. Congressional Action
Both the Senate and House bills recited the same language and
were titled the “Fair and Open Competition Act” (FOCA). 336 Prior
to its failure, eighty-five members of the House endorsed FOCA. 337
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Fair and Open Competition Act, S. 622, 115th Cong. § 1, et seq. (2017).
This Senate bill was introduced by Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ) and supported by
two cosponsors – Senator James E. Risch (R-ID) and David A. Perdue (R-GA).
Fair and Open Competition Act, 115 S. 622, 2017 S. 622, 115 S. 622.
337. Fair and Open Competition Act, (FOCA Act), H.R. 1552, 115th Cong. §
1, et seq. (2017). The House bill was introduced by Rep. Dennis A. Ross (R-FL)
on March 15, 2017 and also sponsored by Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY), Rep.
Mark Walker (R-NC), Rep. Jody B. Hice (R-GA), Rep. Ralph Lee Abraham (RLA), Rep. Gregg Harper (R-MS), Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ), Rep. Mo Brooks (RAL), Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI), Rep. Ken Calvert (R-CA), Rep. Blake
Farenthold (R-TX), Rep. Blake Chabot (R-OH), Rep. John R. Carter (R-TX), Rep.
Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Rep. Jodey C. Arrington (R-TX), Rep. Trey
Hollingsworth (R-IN), Rep. Rick W. Allen (R-GA), Rep. Paul A. Gosar (R-AZ),
Rep. Trent Kelly (R-MS), Rep. Mimi Walters (R-CA), Rep. Darrell E. Issa (RCA), Rep. Luke Messer (R-IN), Rep. Tom Cole (R-OK), Rep. Francis Rooney (RFL), Rep. Ann Wagner (R-MO), Rep. Duncan D. Hunter (R-CA), Rep. Billy Long
(R-MO), Rep. Jason Smith (R-MO), Rep. Blaine Lutkemeyer (R-MO), Rep. John
R. Moolenaar (R-MI), Rep. Lloyd Smucker (R-PA), Rep. Vicky Hartzler (R-MO),
Rep. David Rouzer (R-NC), Rep. Richard Hudson (R-NC), Rep. Edward R. Royce
(R-CA), Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC), Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA), Rep. Kevin Yoder (RKS), Rep. Stephen Knight (R-CA), Rep. Paul Mitchell (R-MI), Rep. Jim Jordan
(R-OH), Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA), Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Rep. Andy
Barr (R-KY), Rep. Bradley Byrne (R-AL), Rep. Robert B. Aderholt (R-AL), Rep.
Barbara Comstock (R-VA), Rep. Mike Bishop (R-MI), Rep. Roger W. Marshall
(R-KS), Rep. John Abney Culberson (R-TX), Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Rep.
Bill Flores (R-TX), Rep. Ted Poe (R-TX), Rep. John H. Rutherford (R-FL), Rep.
Randy K. Weber (R-TX), Rep. Larry Bucshon (R-IN), Rep. Raul R. Labrador (RID), Rep. Todd Rokita (R-IN), Rep. Glenn Thompson (R-PA), Rep. John Ratcliffe
(R-TX), Rep. Mia B. Love (R-UT), Rep. Pete Olson (R-TX), Rep. Lamar Smith
(R-TX), Rep. Justin Amash (R-MI), Rep. Ron Estes (R-KS), Rep. Bruce
Westerman (R-AR), Rep. Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Rep. Kenny Marchant (RTX), Rep. J. French Hill (R-AR), Rep. Pete Sessions (R-TX), Rep. Matt Gaetz (RFL), Rep. Scott DesJarlais (R-TN), Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), Rep. Brad R.
Wenstrup (R-OH), Rep. Ted Budd (R-NC), Rep. George Holding (R-NC), Rep.
Andy Briggs (R-AZ), Rep. John J. Faso (R-NY), Rep. Steve Womack (R-AR),
Rep. Andy Harris (R-MD), Rep. Tim Walberg (R-MI), Rep Markwayne Mullin
(R-OK), Rep. Doug LaMalfa (R-CA), Rep. David P. Roe (R-TN), Rep. Mark
Sanford (R-SC), and Rep. Dave Brat (R-VA). Broken down by state: Texas (13),
California (9), Michigan (5), Missouri (5), North Carolina (5), Indiana (4),
Alabama (3), Arizona (3), Arkansas (3), Florida (3), Kansas (3), Ohio (3),
Pennsylvania (3), Tennessee (3), Virginia (3), Georgia (2), Kentucky (2),
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Neither bill left their respective subcommittees and neither passed
in the 115th Congress.338 However, FOCA may be revisited by
future congressional sessions.
While there is a strong chance Trump would sign FOCA into
law, Trump and Flake, FOCA’s main supporter, had extensive
disagreements.339 Flake then announced he would not run for reelection340 and the senate seat was won by Democrat Kyrsten
Sinema.341
If Congress passed legislation that was facially neutral but
actually banned PLAs, a number of long-term ramifications may
occur. First, this ban would compete with the jurisdiction of the
NLRA; and courts may have to reconcile which government actions
fall under the NLRA and which fall under this new legislation.
These disputes would increase potential litigation and create
confusion nationwide.
Banning PLAs would deeply undermine the very nature of the
bidding process in the construction industry. PLAs address unique
circumstances in construction ranging from mass short-term
employment of workers to timely completion of projects. A total ban
would severely disable unions and speed up their current decline in
power.342 Although many opponents argue that unions are no longer
necessary to assist the workforce, unions have a long history of
supporting individual workers in obtaining a livable wage, securing
safe working conditions, and holding companies responsible for
their actions.343 ABC actively supports the lobbying of this
legislation.344
Mississippi (2), Oklahoma (2), South Carolina (2), Colorado (1), Idaho (1),
Louisiana (1), Maryland (1), New York (1), Utah (1), and Wisconsin (1).
338. 115 Legislative Outlook S. 622 LEXIS.
339. Id.
340. Eric Bradner, Flake's speech burning Trump gets standing ovation from
some Republicans, CNN (Oct. 24, 2017), www.cnn.com/2017/10/24/politics/jeffflake-retirement-arizona/index.html.
341. Tessa Stewart, How Trump Accidentally Helped Democrat Kyrsten
Sinema Flip Jeff Flake’s Arizona Senate Seat, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 13, 2018
at 1:07 PM), www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/sinema-jeff-flakeseat-arizona-754785/.
342. Hannah Fingerhut, More Americans view long-term decline in union
membership negatively than positively, PEW RES. CTR. (Jun. 5, 2018)
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/05/more-americans-view-long-termdecline-in-union-membership-negatively-than-positively/.
343. Id.
344. ABC’s website “urges lawmakers to support the Fair and Open
Competition Act (H.R. 1552/S. 622), which would prevent the government from
mandating a PLAs on federal and federally assisted construction projects,
optimize construction spend and taxpayer value and reward safe performance.
H.R. 1552/S. 622 does noting [sic] to prevent a contractor from voluntarily
entering into a PLA- it only prevents the government from mandating the use
of a PLA as a condition of winning a contract.” ABC strongly opposes
government-mandated Project labor agreements on public construction projects,
ABC, INC., www.abc.org/en-us/politicspolicy/issues/projectlaboragreements.
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IV. PROPOSAL
Many owners choose PLAs to ensure timely completion of their
construction projects even if, at bidding, the contract may cost more.
First, as an owner on federally-funded public construction projects,
the federal government is in the best situation to determine if it
wants PLAs on these projects. If it does, the easiest solution is to
condition federal funds on a PLA. Otherwise, Congress could always
pass a bill narrowly tailored to PLAs. A less practical alternative
would be for Congress to completely update the NLRA, including
provisions pertaining to PLAs. Finally, the Supreme Court could
resolve the circuit split on laws banning PLAs.

A. Condition Federal Funds on PLAs
If the federal government wanted PLAs on its projects, the
easiest solution would be to conditionally require a PLA in order to
receive federal funds. Currently, the federal government provides
federal funding with many conditions. For example, federallyfunded highway projects often mandate environmental impact
statements, noise reports, and disadvantaged business enterprise
(DBE) requirements.345 These conditions, along with many others,
are all within the authority of the federal government under South
Dakota v. Dole.346
Under the Dole test, the federal government would be using its
spending power for the general welfare, with unambiguous
conditions that allow the States a choice and clear consequences for
non-compliance.347 The federal government’s promotion of general
welfare extends to environmental, economic, restorative, and other
societal interests. In considering whether it is accepting federal
funds, States have three options: (1) receive the money on condition
of a PLA, (2) reject the money and fund the project themselves, or
(3) reject the money and forgo the project.348 A PLA condition would
relate to a federal economic and labor interest in nationwide
aspx#LiveTabsContent5923412-lt (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
345. See Fed. Highway Admin., Contract Provisions for Federal-aid
Construction and Service Contracts Required by FHWA or Other Agencies, US
DEP’T. OF TRANSP., www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/contracts/provisions.cfm
(last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (listing a number of contract provisions for federalaid construction and service contracts required by Federal Highway
Administration or other agencies including Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
(DBE) program requirements (49 CFR 26), Davis-Bacon’s prevailing wage
requirements (23 U.S.C. 113 and 40 U.S.C. 3141), environmental requirements
(2 CFR Part 200 Appendix II (G) and (H)), and procurement requirements (2
CFR Part 200 at Appendix II (K)).
346. Dole, 483 U.S. 203.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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projects because the federal government is acting as a proprietor in
providing these funds.349 As an owner, the federal government
should have the discretion to require conditions or enter into
agreements it sees fit. Finally, because the States could refuse to
accept the federal funds, the condition of funding would be argued
as state pressure and not one of compulsion.350
State governments may elect to use federal funds for projects,
especially when the federal government is footing most of the bill.
Then States will not have to spend as much of their own funds on
necessary projects. In accepting the funding, the State must
comport with any conditions set forth in the PLA. These conditions
often include prevailing wage requirements, disadvantaged
business enterprise requirements, and environmental impact
studies.351 Large federal projects require prevailing wage whether
or not the union is employed.352 Therefore, the concern for using a
PLA because of wage requirements is moot.
States that reject the condition must decide the importance of
the project. If important, the State must come up with its own funds
to finance the project without a PLA. Although states may elect to
use non-union labor on their own projects, many choose union labor
because they must comply with Davis Bacon and therefore the cost
are equal.353 The states that oppose PLAs will likely reject PLAs on
smaller projects that are easier to fund and unlikely to reject larger
projects where majority of costs are covered by federal funding. If
not important, the State may completely forgo the construction
project. Either way, the federal government may divert its funds to
other projects that include PLAs.

B. Congressional Action
1. Pass a Law Specifically Addressing PLAs
Next, Congress could limit its focus only to PLAs in order to
pass a bill. Current congressional bills titled Fair Open and
Competition Acts specifically address PLAs. 354 These facially
neutral, yet discriminatory in effect, Acts result from extensive
lobbying by the Association of Builders & Contractors to end
PLAs.355 If Congress wanted to put an end to PLAs, it could
reintroduce and pass the Fair and Open Competition Act. These

349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Fed. Highway Admin., Davis-Bacon and Related Acts, Questions and
Answers, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., www.fhwa.dot.gov/construction/contracts/
dbra_qa.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
353. Id.
354. FOCA, supra note 337.
355. Lund & Oswald, supra note 100, at 2.
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current bills mirror state legislation in states that seek to use nonunion labor.356 Because the Act closely resembles many of the states’
anti-PLA legislation, passing this Act would strengthen anti-PLA
states.357 Alternatively, if this bill is not reintroduced or passed, and
the majorities in the House and Senate shift to the democratic
stance, Congress may pass a bill promoting the use of PLAs.
2. Update the NLRA
The most powerful and effective, yet highly unlikely, solution
would be for Congress to update the NLRA. Congress has already
preempted this area of labor law in passing the NLRA, 358 but labor
law has substantially changed since 1935. 359 There has been no
congressional update of the NLRA since the Landrum-Griffin Act.360
Updating the NLRA would clear up confusion not just with PLAs,
but also other uncertainties in labor law. 361 Unfortunately, our
current Congress is unlikely to pass any amendments. 362 If our
current conservative Senate could pass amendments, those laws
would likely undercut unions and the authority of the NLRA. If the
balance of power shifts to a more liberal Congress, I predict that
revisions would likely promote labor relations.

C. Further Clarification from the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court could grant certiorari on another PLA
case. Any further ruling on the circuit split issue may clarify the
law and uphold precedent: striking overly broad laws that promote
policy and upholding narrowly tailored laws that further a
356. FOCA, supra note 337.
357. Passing the congressional act as drafted would strengthen anti-PLA
states because the neutral language of the act has been determined by various
courts to be discriminatory in effect. Therefore, if Congress were to pass FOCA,
states would theoretically be able to discriminate on both state-funded projects
and federally-funded projects.
358. Infra Section Background (D).
359. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1947).
360. Id.; see also James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the
Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 524 (2014) (stating
“following longstanding legislative gridlock, engineered by labor and
management as powerful interest groups, Congress has failed to update the
NLRA since 1959. This remarkable period of congressional inaction has left the
NLRB on a political island”).
361. See generally Michael H. Gottesman & Michael R. Seidl, A Tale of Two
Discourses: William Gould's Journey from the Academy to the World of Politics,
47 STAN. L. REV. 749, 765-66 (1995) (arguing to update the NLRA regarding its
statutory purpose of promoting collective bargaining relationships); James J.
Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C.L. REV. 939, 1024 (1996).
362. See Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, www.govtrack.
us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (showing that Congress
has only enacted 3% of proposed legislation in the 115th Congress).
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procurement interest.363 In following the precedent set in Boston
Harbor, Gould, and Brown, the Supreme Court’s holding may find
current legislative and executive action by the states to be in
violation of the Supremacy Clause and strike down all laws that ban
PLAs.364
However, the current conservative majority on the court will
likely enforce a ban on PLAs to encourage “competition.”365 In 2018,
the Supreme Court held that “fair share” policies violate the First
Amendment by forcing employees to join unions, instead of allowing
voluntary membership.366 Also in 2018, the Supreme Court upheld
arbitration agreements that imposed individual proceedings for
employees and “must be enforced as written.” 367 Therefore,
considering the political stance of the Justices, both sides may
consider lobbying Congress as a more efficient method.

D. What Won’t Work
Executive Orders are not a permanent solution. Since the first
presidential executive order in 1992,368 each executive order shifted
the current labor policy.369 This fluctuating policy continues to leave
uncertainty and instability throughout all levels of government.370
Future presidential executive orders regarding PLAs will only add
to the confusion and seek to muddy the waters dependent on the
political party in office, which changes quite often. Instead, it would
be more prudent to leave the policy and law-making decisions to
Congress.
363. Were the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on another PLA case, it
may further reinforce and clarify the precedent set out in Boston Harbor.
364. If the Supreme Court were to find that the discriminatory nature of
state legislative and executive action violated the supremacy clause, the state
bans on PLAs would be unconstitutional and agencies would more readily be
able to determine their need for PLAs on a case-by-case basis.
365. The current conservative court does not appear interested in
supporting union activity. Instead, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a
number of cases that indicate a non-union stance and subsequently ruled
against union activity.
366. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 851 F.3d 746, 747 (7th Cir. 2017)
(overruled by Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (“Janus”))
(upholding the “fair share” policy which requires non-union employees who
receive union benefits to contribute to union fees). The Supreme Court held that
“fair share” policies violate the First Amendment. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478.
367. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (deciding that
labor employees can contractually waive their right to class actions and forcibly
submit to arbitration).
368. Exec. Orders, supra note 86.
369. Exec Orders, supra note 78.
370. Although the federal government has discretion on whether or not to
include PLAs on federally-funded projects, states have either prohibited or
required the use of PLAs on their projects. When party politics in states shift,
the construction industry must adapt to the changes, generally to its
disadvantage.
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While waiting on the next executive order will likely result in
a continued pattern of confusion regarding PLAs in the construction
industry, various avenues exist to fix the confusion. Federal
governments can use their market-participant status to effectuate
PLAs in exchange for funding. Alternatively, both sides may lobby
Congress to either update the NLRA or pass a PLA-specific bill.
Finally, the least practical alternative would be for the Supreme
Court to rule on a PLA case.

V.

CONCLUSION

Between the long-delayed need for infrastructure and response
to recent natural disasters in the United States, the use of project
labor agreements will likely rise as construction projects increase.
Even though the chief complaints against PLAs are increased costs
and decreased competition, these issues are moot on federally
funded projects. Because large-scale federally funded projects must
comply with Davis-Bacon’s prevailing wage, the projects essentially
cost the same with or without a PLA. Many owners take comfort in
a PLA, which assures that project workers are sufficiently trained
to efficiently complete the project in a timely and safe manner.
Every construction project carries with it the risk of weather
changes, additional costs, labor disputes, and delays. Certainly,
many of these risks are not within the control of the owner or
contractors. However, owners should seek to minimize any risks
that are within their control and many of those include labor issues
which can be laid out in a PLA. It should therefore be up to the
individual governmental agencies to determine whether to use a
PLA on any given project and not be debilitated by a contractual
ban by the legislature.
However, since many state governments disfavor PLAs, the
federal government must decide if using PLAs is in its best interest.
If so, the federal government has a number of options to implement
the usage of PLAs, including conditioning funding on PLAs,
introducing a bill supporting or opposing PLAs, or amending the
NLRA to reflect the current stance. This leaves the states
opportunities on construction projects and autonomy to decide
whether the funding is worth the contractual obligation of a PLA.
Otherwise, disagreements between unions and non-union
contractors will likely result in increased litigation and it may be
years before the Supreme Court adjudicates the issue.

